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Abstract  
 
Decentralisation of governance responsibilities to sub-national authorities has been 
one of the most significant trends in state-reform since the 1980s. Debate continues, 
however, regarding the consequences of the expansion of local/district government 
for ethno-communal relations. This study develops a strategic-relational theory of 
decentralisation and ethno-communal voter mobilisation, testing it in relation to 
electoral processes in two ethno-religiously diverse districts in Indonesia. It finds that 
in the context of city or district politics, outcomes of voter mobilisation can only be 
accounted for via the interaction between institutional incentives and candidates’ 
mobilisation of diverse personal, group and associational ties. This study has 
implications for analysing and theorising the impacts of decentralisation- especially 
the expansion of local and district government- upon patterns of ethno-communal 
mobilisation in other ethnically and religiously diverse societies undergoing 
transitions to democratic rule.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
6	  of	  102	  
Acknowledgement 
 
 
 
 
For my parents. I hope one day I can begin to give back. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
7	  of	  102	  
Introduction 
The collapse of authoritarian regimes and the ‘third wave of democratisation’ 
(Huntington 1991) has drawn increasing attention to ethnicity and identity as “forces 
shaping human affairs, phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled” 
(Horowitz 1985: xi). With the liberalisation of political space through democratisation, 
representatives of ethnic groups, sub-clans and minority communities have sought to 
enhance their place within the democratic arena. Ethnic and regionalist parties have 
grown in political strength in established Western and ‘Third Wave’ democracies 
alike- rekindling age-old debates about the reconciliation of territorial or traditional 
notions of ethno-communal identity with democracy (Dahl 1956). Especially in 
‘deeply divided’ societies recovering from civil conflict or ethnically-based genocide, 
there has been increasing scepticism about the viability and stability of democratic 
regimes in multiethnic societies (Mann 2005). Whilst the absence of ethnic conflict 
has generally been the norm in most plural societies (Fearon 1996), the seemingly 
intractable nature of many conflicts about ethnic and communal identity has 
generated increased attention on the influence of institutional design in constructing 
democratic political frameworks oriented to the peaceful management of ethno-
cultural diversity. 
 
Approaches to ‘political engineering’ (Reilly 2007) have focused mainly on four key 
areas of democratic practice: electoral regulations (proportional or majoritarian); the 
party system (ethnic/regional parties or national parties); the composition of cabinets 
(all inclusive coalition governments or electoral coalitions); and the allocation of 
administrative, fiscal or political to various levels of government- what is referred to 
throughout this study as ‘decentralisation’. Both cross-national and case-study 
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analysis suggests that the effective design of electoral regulations, party systems 
and cabinet contributes to the stability and inclusivity of multi-ethnic democracy- 
regardless of the theoretical or ontological approach adopted to the accommodation 
or integration of group interests into national democratic processes (Lijphart 1969; 
Lijphart 1977; Reilly 2001; Norris 2004). 
 
Clear trends about political arrangements at national level have emerged concerning 
the impact of parties, electoral regulations and cabinet inclusivity on minority 
representation and inter-group relations. However, debate continues regarding the 
impacts of decentralisation on inter-group relations at the state level. Much theory 
and analysis about decentralisation in multiethnic societies has focused on the 
effects of providing ‘segmental autonomy’ to ‘politically relevant’ ethnic groups as 
proposed by prominent advocates of consociational democracy such as Arend 
Lijhpart (1969, 1977). By contrast, studies on this ‘ethno-federal’ form of 
decentralisation- often implemented ‘asymmetrically’ by provision of autonomy to a 
single regional movement as part of broader strategies of power-sharing- report that 
decentralisation may institutionalise cultural cleavages grounded in territorially-based 
ethnic identities (Hale 2004; Bakke 2006; Roeder 2007; Deiwiks 2010) 
 
The intense scholarly interest in asymmetric ethno-federalism and ethno-communal 
relations stands in sharp relief to the limited attention paid to state reform in which 
decentralisation has occurred ‘symmetrically’ across all regions within a country. 
This is despite this form of decentralisation being by far the most common form since 
the ‘global wave’ of administrative and fiscal decentralisation that commenced in the 
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1980s (Schneider 2003). Often justified by neoclassical theories of ‘competitive 
federalism’ , the role of non-central political jurisdictions in the fiscal, political and 
administrative operations of the state has expanded significantly in developed and 
developing, federal and unitary states alike over the past three decades (Norris 2008: 
157). This process of state reform has generated econometric and qualitative studies 
assessing the impact of various forms of decentralisation on outcomes ranging from 
economic growth, service delivery, popular political participation and the mitigation of 
corruption (Bardhan and Mookherjee 1999; Treisman 2007). Seemingly as a 
consequence of limitations in cross-national data on local government, most of this 
analysis has not distinguished between the differential effects of devolving 
governance responsibilities to provincial- or 1st tier -jurisdictions and 2nd tier 
administrations such as district or municipal governments (Rodden 2004). The few 
studies that have acknowledged this distinction have not explicitly examined the 
impact of decentralisation upon the political mobilisation of ethno-communal groups 
(Cole 2006; Falleti 2010). Consequentially, whilst empirical evidence is extensive on 
the conflict mitigating or inducing effects of ‘asymmetrical’ decentralisation, the 
impact of ‘symmetrical’ decentralisation on patterns of ethno-communal cooperation 
and competition in ethnically diverse states remains a subject of continuing debate 
(Basedau 2011).  
 
It is this lacuna that this study seeks to partially fill by develops a strategic-relational 
theory of decentralisation that emphasises the interaction between classical strategic 
as well as relational incentives provided by political institutions for ethno-communal 
mobilisation. This study then analyses processes of elite mobilisation in the recent 
electoral campaigns of two districts of Indonesia- Poso, Central Sulawesi (2005) and 
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Medan, North Sumatra (2010) to assess the plausibility of the adapted centripetalist 
theory (George and Bennett 2005: 75). Whilst Indonesia’s particular institutional 
arrangements are unique in several respects, this study has significant theoretical 
implications for the impact of decentralisation- especially at the local district level. 
These implications include ethnic competition and the processes whereby 
decentralisation effects inter-group tensions, prevents regional separatism and limits 
group identity politics in the national political arenas of other ethno-culturally diverse 
democracies. In the context of ethnically and religiously divided societies undergoing 
transitions to democratic rule, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation 
proposed in this thesis may be useful in explaining the impacts of decentralisation- 
especially the expansion of local government- upon patterns of ethno-communal 
mobilisation.  
 
This study proceeds in six parts. The first section introduces the dominant theories of 
political engineering and institutional design and their limitations. The section then 
proposes the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation, building on the logic of 
classical centripetalism. Section two justifies case-selection and outlines the 
methodology utilised and variables assessed in process-tracing elite strategies of 
identity-based voter mobilisation in all stages of the electoral process. The third 
section sets the national context for the case-studies, outlining the evolution of 
macro-frameworks aimed at management of Indonesia’s ethno-cultural diversity in 
the post-Suharto era. The fourth and fifth sections then conduct case-studies of 
recent district elections in Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra. The 
six concludes, summarising key findings, outlining implications and suggesting 
avenues for further research. 
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Ch 2 Political Engineering: Assumptions and Limitations  
 
Strategies of political engineering in ethnically diverse societies primarily stem from 
two divergent theoretical approaches to democratic state-building: consociationalism, 
advocating inter-ethnic accommodation and centripetalism which emphasises 
political integration and inter-group cooperation1. Each theory offers a range of 
distinct prescriptions to ensure that differences of ethnic identity can either be 
accommodated or integrated into larger political processes. After outlining the two 
dominant paradigms, this section will highlight the uni-dimensional conceptualisation 
of identity underpinning notions of incentives. A broader notion of strategic-relational 
incentives is proposed and a constructivist theory of decentralisation and identity 
mobilisation outlined that more fully explains the mobilisation strategies employed by 
elites.  
 
Consociationalism 
Consociationalism is most closely associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, who 
identified four structural features shared by consociational systems—a grand 
coalition government (between parties from different segments of society), 
segmental autonomy (in the cultural sector), proportionality (in the voting system and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  third	  paradigm-­‐	  power	  dividing-­‐	  emphasises	  the	  sub-­‐division	  of	  government	  powers	  and	  jurisdictions	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  creating	  multiple	  overlapping	  majorities	  and	  minorities	  that	  cut	  across	  ethnic	  groups.	  Based	  primarily	  on	  Madisonian	  federalism	  this	  approach	  follows	  a	  similar	  integrationist	  logic	  to	  centripetalism	  and	  will	  not	  be	  explored	  in	  this	  study.	  For	  a	  full	  theoretical	  exposition	  see	  Roeder,	  P.	  (2011).	  Power	  Dividing.	  Conflict	  Management	  in	  Divided	  Societies:	  Theories	  and	  Practice.	  S.	  Wolff	  and	  C.	  Yakinthou.	  London,	  Routledge.	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in public sector employment) and minority veto (Lijphart, 1977: 25-52). However, 
following initial development in the 1960s the theoretical literature now 
acknowledges a distinction between corporate and liberal consociationalism. The 
latter is now the more common policy prescription among consociationalists (Wolff 
2011: 7). The main theoretical difference lies in the approach to group identity. 
Corporate consociation “accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, and 
rests on the assumption that group identities are fixed, and that groups are both 
internally homogeneous and externally bounded” (McGarry 2007: 172). In contrast, 
“liberal … consociation … rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in 
democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group or 
trans-group identities” (Lijphart 1995; McGarry 2007: 172). 
 
In relation to power sharing, as the primary element of institutional design, liberal 
consociational theory promotes cooperation and consensus among democratically 
legitimised elites- regardless of whether they emerge on the basis of group identities, 
ideology or other common interest (Wolff 2011: 8). Liberal consociationalists thus 
privilege parliamentary systems, proportional (PR list) or proportional preferential 
electoral systems, decision-making procedures that require qualified and/or 
concurrent majorities. As Wolff (2011) observes in addition to emphasising power-
sharing, liberal consociationalism also increasingly advocates self-governance- with 
special emphasis being placed on territorial self-governance for relevant ethnic 
groups. In this regard arrangements in which there are more than two, and ideally 
even more than three, self-governing entities within a given state, are seen as 
enhancing to the propsects of state survival. Consociationalism therefore strongly 
supports the principle of asymmetric decentralisation of powers, ie. some self-
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governing entities are vested with more (or fewer) competences than others in order 
to better reflect the preferences of their populations (McGarry 2007). 
 
Centripetalism 
In contrast to the ‘accommodationist’ approach of consociationalism, centripetalism 
sees intergroup cooperation as best achieved by “electoral systems that provide 
incentives for parties to form coalitions across group lines or in other ways moderate 
their ethnocentric political behaviour” (Horowitz 2004: 507-508). Thus, Reilly, in his 
systematic exposition of centripetalist theory advocates ‘(i) electoral incentives for 
campaigning politicians to reach out to and attract votes from a range of ethnic 
groups other than their own…; (ii) arenas of bargaining, under which political actors 
from different groups have an incentive to come together to negotiate and bargain in 
the search for cross-partisan and cross-ethnic vote-pooling deals…; and (iii) centrist, 
aggregative political parties or coalitions which seek multi-ethnic support…’ (Reilly 
2001: 11; emphasis in original).  
Critical to the success of institutional design in centripetalist theory is a balance of 
self-rule (territorial or other forms of self-governance) and shared rule (power sharing) 
achieved through integrationist “electoral incentives, that accord an advantage to 
ethnically based parties that are willing to appeal, at the margin and usually through 
coalition partners of other ethnic groups, to voters other than their own” (Horowitz 
2008: 1217). In addition to “policies that give regionally concentrated groups a strong 
stake in the center” (Horowitz, 1993: 36), Horowitz has proposes territorial self-
governance or decentralisation of power to ethnically heterogeneous jurisdictions.  
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Citing the experience of Nigeria, Horowitz argues for dividing large ethnic groups into 
several provinces to encourage the proliferation of political parties within one ethnic 
group (Horowitz, 1985: 602-4; 2007: 960-1; 2008: 1218). In later studies focused on 
federation as a mechanism for conflict reduction Horowitz also posits that 
homogeneous provinces can also assist in fostering intra-group competition 
(Horowitz 2007: 960-961; Horowitz 2008: 1218). In essence, however, the 
centripetalist approach to the impact of decentralisation on identity mobilisation 
constitutes the inverse of the consociational emphasis of management of ethnic 
diversity through territorial autonomy and national power-sharing. 
 
Limits of Both Approaches: Identity and Incentives 
Both consociational and centripetal approaches to political engineering share the 
assumption- derived from rational choice theory (Riker 1964; Filippov 2004)- that 
inter-group conflict can be abated through the design of political institutions which 
provide micro-level incentives to elites and their supporters to accommodate each 
other or cooperate across group identity boundaries. A conceptual distinction must 
therefore be made in considering the design of political institutions between i) macro-
level frameworks that facilitate the dispersion of incentives in a predictable and 
continuing manner, and ii) the incentives themselves. Whilst normatively distinct in 
their objectives, both approaches posit that stable institutions emerge when the 
actors involved in them have strong and enduring incentives to ‘reproduce’ them: “if 
the incentives provided are desirable and cannot be gained otherwise, existing 
arrangements would appear to be acceptable and… would thus be likely to be stable” 
(Wolff 2011: 2). Embedded within this theory of stable political institutions transmitted 
through micro-incentives is a deeply contested notion of ethnic and group identity. 
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Consociationalists take the view that, once formed through socialisation- and 
potentially conflict- group identities are “relatively hardened and difficult, if not 
impossible, to change” (Wolff 2011: 16). Ethnic identities are “so deeply rooted in 
historical experience that [they] should properly be treated as a given” in the design 
of structures and regulations which motivate ethnic elites to share power and 
manage conflict amongst their respective communities (Esman 1994: 10-11). 
Consociational political frameworks therefore structure incentives on the basis of 
elites managing the violent mobilisation those who share a single identity- that of 
their ethnicity.  
 
The uni-dimensional consociational approach to ethnicity and incentives is 
challenged by constructivist theories that perceive individuals as possessing a 
‘repertoire’ of multiple personal and group identities- the relative importance of which 
are subject to change and evolution over time (Esman, 1994: 10-1). In this 
conceptualisation, ethnicity is seen as being multi-dimensional, rarely associated 
with conflict and often endogenous- rather than exogenous- to the political process 
(Fearon 2000; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Fearon 2006; Roeder 2007; Deiwiks 
2010).  
 
Whilst there is significant disagreement regarding specific definitions of ‘ethnicity’ 
(Green 2004), there is an assumption that individuals can choose to ‘activate’ or 
accentuate their particular ethnic and group identities from a variety of ‘nominal’ 
categories traced to ancestry- for instance language, race, religion or association 
with a homeland (Fearon 2006). Recent empirical research in constructivism 
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emphasises that the identity/identities that individuals choose to activate or politically 
mobilise will vary over time contingent upon institutional and political incentives such 
as affirmative action policies or ethnically-based distribution of patronage (Sardan 
1999; Chandra 2008: 92). These ‘identity-options’ (Waters 1990) are not open ended, 
but are limited by a particular person’s ‘attribute-repertoire’- though the ‘boundaries’ 
of ethnic identities can be subject to redefinition for political purposes (Chandra 2006: 
419; Ferree 2010).  
 
The constructivist conceptualisation of identity activation has significant implications 
for the rational choice notion of ‘incentives’ created by political institutions. If ethnic 
identities are multi-dimensional then political elites have options with regard to 
mobilisation of ethnic and group identities as numerous dimensions “might serve as 
a basis for coalition formation” (Posner 2005: 4). Regarding group identities as more  
‘malleable’ and contextually contingent, centripetalism provides strategic incentives 
for cooperation between ethnic groups- for example through preferential or 
alternative vote (AV) ballot systems that enable ethnic groups to support their ‘own’ 
candidates whilst also exchanging preferences with parties and candidates from 
other ethnic groups (Reilly 2001; Horowitz 2004). In addition to electoral incentives, 
centripetalism also sees federalism- or the decentralisation of power to sub-national 
governments- as a strategy to territorially divide groups. In this approach, 
decentralisation is seen to alter elite strategies of ethnic group mobilisation by 
engendering increased intra-ethnic competition for the same political office.  As an 
example, if numerous candidates from the same ethnic group- for example Tamil- 
compete against each other in a provincial election, these candidates will be 
presented with two incentives.  
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The first incentive is to mobilise more specific categories of their ethnic identity- for 
example their membership of a particular Tamil sub-clan or group. This has the 
effect of dividing the Tamil ethnic base, limiting the likelihood of unified ethnic 
mobilisation (Horowitz 2007: 960-961). Where mobilisation of Tamil sub-clan identity 
provides insufficient support to obtain election, candidates have a second incentive- 
to cooperate with candidates from other ethnic groups- for instance as a Tamil-
Singhalese pairing. The centripetalist understanding of individuals possessing a 
single, politically salient ethnic identity leads to the hypothesis that (H1) 
decentralisation increases political competition, leading candidates to 
mobilise sub-ethnic identities and/or cooperate with candidates from other 
ethnic groups. For centripetalists, the incentives for mobilisation provided by macro-
frameworks- for example in the context of federalism or decentralisation of powers- 
are therefore strategic incentives for inter-group cooperation or the mobilisation of 
sub-ethnic identities.  
 
The differences between consociationalism and centripetalism in macro-framework 
design and the varying notion of incentives for ethnic identity mobilisation and inter-
group cooperation are outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1 Consociational and centripetal frameworks. Source: Reilly 2006: 95 
 Consociationalism Centripetalism 
Elections List PR; large  
districts to maximize 
proportional 
outcomes 
Vote-­‐pooling to 
ensure elected 
politicians have 
support across 
communities 
(preferential; AV) 
Parties Ethnic parties each  
representing their 
Non-­‐ethnic or  
multi-­‐ethnic parties or 
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own community party coalitions 
Cabinets Grand coalition  
governments; 
minority veto on 
important issues 
Multi-­‐ethnic  
coalition 
governments; no 
minority vetoes 
Decentralisation Segmental  
autonomy and 
ethnic federalism 
Non-­‐ethnic  
federalism or 
autonomy 
 
As with consociationalism, the notion of identity implicit within classical centripetalist 
theory is constrained does not include the logical extension of the hypothesised 
‘fragmentation effect’: that individuals and political elites possess a ‘repertoire’ of 
identities, networks and associational ties, each of which may be ‘activated’ in order 
to mobilise supporters (Esman 1994: 10-11). The notion of incentives in both 
consociationalism and centripetalism restricts the agency of political elites and 
candidates to a single ethnic identity and it’s sub-components. This notion of 
incentives created by macro-political frameworks fails to provide an adequate 
account of identity mobilisation in the context of decentralisation.  
 
A Strategic-Relational Theory of Identity and Decentralisation 
This study builds on the classical centripetalist theory by proposing that the political 
strategies adopted by elites in the context of decentralisation can only be accounted 
for by how incentives imparted by macro-frameworks are reinterpreted by political 
elites in light of their respective “identities, interests and capabilities” (Jessop 2001: 
1224). In so doing it accepts the supposition in classical centripetal theory that 
decentralisation of powers to provincial or local governments lowers the barriers to 
meaningful political participation. However, it builds on this theory by positing that the 
outcome of ethno-communal mobilisation in the context of decentralisation will be 
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determined by the interaction between political competition and the specific identities, 
social networks and capabilities that candidates possess. 
In placing emphasis upon the interaction of structural incentives, political competition 
and the mobilisation strategies of political elites, this theory is informed by Jessop’s 
(2001) strategic-relational approach to analysis of institutions and individual agency. 
Jessop emphasises “the possibility of reflection on the part of the individual and 
collective actors about the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures” when 
determining their own political strategies and tactics (2001: 1224- emphasis added). 
Actors are taken to possess a capacity for reflexivity in the context of structural 
incentives- enabling the theoretical space for a constructivist notion of incentives 
operating across a range of identity and political categories.  
 
At the centre of the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation is a primary 
intervening mechanism: that after having weighed the various relational ties of other 
candidates, political elites will- “in the light of their understanding of the current 
conjecture and their ‘feel for the game” (Jessop 2001: 1224)- mobilise those 
dimensions of their identity repertoire that may enable them to form a winning 
coalition of voters vis a vis other candidates (Riker 1962; Posner 2005).  
 
Rather than macro-frameworks being the sole explanation of elite and mass 
mobilisation, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and identity posits: (H2) 
strategic incentives of political competition associated with decentralisation 
interact with the identities, social networks and capabilities of candidates in 
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determining the mobilisation strategies adopted by political elites. In the prior 
classical centripetalist example of a Tamil ethnic group from which numerous 
candidates compete, the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation predicts that in 
candidates will assess the various sub-ethnic, religious and other group identities in 
their repertoire- in addition to various network and associational ties- to form 
strategies of ethno-communal mobilisation. Only by considering the interaction 
between the relational options of candidates and the strategic incentives created by 
macro-frameworks of institutional design may the outcome of ethno-communal 
mobilisation be accounted for. 
 
The hypothesised process of candidate reflexivity logically has application to the 
formulation of mobilisation strategies at any tier of government. However, in the 
context of decentralisation, social and relational ties between voters and political 
processes have an important impact on mobilisation of voters (Niven 2004)- 
especially in the context of ‘mediated’ or patronage democracies where voter ties to 
political elites may be an important factor determining whether and how they access 
state benefits (Chandra 2007). In these contexts, the process whereby elites 
formulate strategies of voter mobilisation (outlined in Figure 1) and the extent to 
which these align with particular ethnic or personal identities will have significant 
consequences for the politicisation of group identity and ethno-communal relations. 
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Figure 1 Classical Centripetal and Strategic-Relational Theories of 
Decentralisation and Ethno-Communal Mobilisation 
The strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and elite strategy does not predict 
whether or how decentralisation effects ethnic ties developed through long histories 
of socialisation and inter-group bonding (Esman 1994; Putnam 2000: 10). Rather, it 
simply posits that outcomes of ethno-communal mobilisation will only be accounted 
for by considering the interaction between strategic factors of increased competition 
and the various relational ties (ethnic and group identities, associational ties etc) 
possessed by candidates. The typological theory proposed in this study therefore 
seeks to fill a lacuna in the present literature vital to fully understanding the 
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processes whereby macro-frameworks of political institutions impact local elite 
strategies of identity mobilisation and politicisation of group identity.  
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Ch 3: Methods/Research Design 
To assess whether the strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and ethno-
communal mobilisation provides a fuller account of the mechanisms whereby 
incentives created by macro-frameworks influence elite strategies of identity-based 
voter mobilisation, this study undertakes a plausibility probe of recent election 
campaigns in two districts of The Republic of Indonesia. 
 
Case-Country Selection: Indonesia 
Indonesia has been selected as the case-country for this study as the country’s 
macro-political frameworks and complex profile of more than fifty ethnic groups, 450 
languages and 10,000 islands provides several local political entities with a situation 
ideal to test this theory through a plausibility probe.  
 
Moreover, Indonesia is a useful national context to test the strategic-relational theory 
in this study due to the strongly centripetalist electoral and party regulations at both 
national and district level. In 2004, Indonesia introduced direct elections for 
executives at all tiers of government and crafted new electoral and party regulations 
that require all candidates to be endorsed by parties with offices in at least 60 
percent of provinces (Aspinall 2005; Reilly 2006). Nationally, these regulations 
resulted in the first direct elections for Indonesia’s President since the 1950s 
(Aspinall 2005). At the regional level, democratisation resulted in the introduction of 
direct local election of district heads (bupati) and their deputies by local constituents, 
shifting this power from the party-dominated district legislature (Buehler 2010). 
Indonesia’s introduction of direct elections and promulgation of new electoral and 
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party regulations in the context of significant decentralisation to the district level 
provides a useful country setting in which to conduct a plausibility probe of the 
strategic-relational theory of decentralisation and identity-based voter mobilisation.  
 
In 1999, following the end of the 32 years rule of Suharto’s New Order regime, 
Indonesia underwent a period of fundamental political reconstruction in which 
transitional democratic frameworks were coupled with the introduction of an 
ambitious decentralisation program- devolving substantial fiscal and political power 
from the central government to the district (kabupaten) level, largely bypassing the 
provincial level of administration (Hofman and Kaiser 2006).  
 
Upwards of 30 percent of total national expenditures are now made by district 
administrations in areas as ranging from health care, education to infrastructure 
(Suhendra 2006). Administrative and fiscal powers were provided to all districts and 
provinces across the country on a ‘symmetrical’ basis2. The equal treatment of 
districts in the decentralisation of political and administrative responsibilities 
eliminates any selection bias that may present in other countries that have 
decentralised responsibilities for governance (at least initially) on an asymmetric 
basis as a concession to a mobilised regional autonomy movement.3  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Special	  arrangements	  were	  made	  in	  Papua	  and	  Aceh,	  though	  these	  are	  not	  considered	  in	  this	  study.	  3	  This	  has	  occurred	  in	  numerous	  ethno-­‐linguistically	  heterogeneous	  federations,	  where	  decentralisation	  to	  sub-­‐national	  entities	  has	  commenced	  through	  asymmetric	  processes	  in	  which	  a	  single	  region	  or	  province	  within	  a	  state	  is	  granted	  greater	  political	  and	  fiscal	  autonomy	  in	  order	  to	  sate	  the	  demands	  of	  regional	  separatists.	  Examples	  include:	  the	  Basque	  region	  in	  Spain,	  Crimea	  in	  Ukraine,	  Corsica	  in	  France	  and	  Quebec	  in	  Canada.	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For definitional purposes it is important to clarify that Indonesia’s second-level 
administrative regions, below the level of the province, are termed kabupaten. This 
term refers both to administrations located in rural areas (usually translated as 
districts), and kota, which are urban (usually translated as municipalities) (Aspinall 
2011). They are headed by, respectively, bupati (district heads or regents) and 
walikota (mayors). It is convenient in this study to refer to both rural districts and kota 
are referred to as ‘districts’.  
 
Level of Analysis: Districts 
Districts were selected as the principle level of analysis as they were provided with 
the primary role of service delivery in Indonesia’s 1999 legislation on fiscal 
decentralisation and since 2002 have been responsible for over 30 percent of 
national expenditures (Suhendra 2006). As posited by the classical centripetalist 
theory of decentralisation, the increased powers provided to district government 
should result in increased competition for control of the local executive, with ethno-
communal identity possibly emerging as a significant base for voter mobilisation.  
 
This study therefore seeks to assess the extent to which district-level patterns of 
ethno-communal mobilisation at both elite and mass level are influenced by the 
interaction of strategic incentives and the relational options possessed by candidates. 
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Case District Selection 
This study assesses the plausibility of the strategic-relational mechanism in 
determining outcomes of elite strategy and mass mobilisation by selecting two cases 
for analysis: Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra. By selecting case-
districts that are socio-structurally different, this study assesses whether the 
mechanisms hypothesised to be causal in the proposed theory are limited by a 
variety of scope conditions such as population size, past experience of ethno-
communal conflict and vibrancy of associational life (George and Bennett 2005: 25). 
 
Poso, Central Sulawesi 
The first case in this study is the 2005 pilkada (election) in Poso, Central Sulawesi 
Province. Poso is a predominantly rural district with an ethnically and religiously 
mixed population of around 190,0004 that includes a large population of Muslim 
migrant workers (30 percent) from South Sulawesi and Sumatra (BPS 2004b). 
Between 1998 and 2002 Poso was the scene of a protracted Christian-Muslim 
conflict in which at least 1,000 were killed and at the height of violence saw the 
majority of the district (147,000 people) to flee their homes to outlying areas (van 
Klinken, 2007, Aragon 2008, Varshney 2010). Poso was re-districted in 1999 and 
again in 2003 on the basis of ethnic and religious demography. It now has a 
population which is 30 percent Muslim and 65 percent Christian (Tirtosudarmo 2006: 
15). Given the severity of recent Christian-Muslim violence, assessing strategies of 
voter mobilisation in post-conflict Poso will provide a useful test of whether and how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Exact	  population	  figures	  are	  unavailable	  as	  a	  census	  has	  not	  been	  conducted	  since	  redistricting	  in	  2003.	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incentives created by macro-frameworks of party and electoral regulations impacted 
incentives to activate other relational ties to mobilise voters also.  
 
Medan, North Sumatra 
The second case is the 2010 district election in Indonesia’s fourth largest city- 
Medan in North Sumatra Province. In contrast to the predominantly rural profile of 
Poso, Medan is a major Indonesian city with a large commercial economy and 
ethnically and religiously diverse population of 1.9 million people (BPS 2004a; 
Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 30). The city has a rich associational life with 
numerous ethnic organisations, religious groups, trade unions and a number of 
gangster (preman) networks (Hadiz 2004; Agustono 2008). In contrast to Poso, 
Medan has experienced little large-scale ethno-communal conflict.5  
 
 Apart from Medan’s socio-economic differences from Poso, the recent 2010 
elections- which occurred in two rounds- also enables assessment to which variance 
in the extent of competition accounts for the mobilisation strategies of elites in an 
urbanised district that is not ‘deeply divided’. Medan therefore provides a useful 
context in which to assess the scope conditions of the strategic-relational theory. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Anti-Chinese riots did occur during the final days of the Suharto regime in 1998, 
though this violence may have been coordinated by the military Nagata, J. (2003). 
"Local and Transnational Initiatives Towards Improving Chinese-Indigenous 
Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The 
Role of the Voluntary Sector." Asian Ethnicity 4(3): 369-381, Panggabean, S. S., 
Benjamin (2011). "Explaining Anti-Chinese Riots in Late 20th Century Indonesia." 
World Development 39(2): 231-242.. 	  
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
28	  of	  102	  
Within-Case Methods & Variables 
To establish the relevance of candidate’s social ties and their interaction with 
strategic incentives in the 2005 Poso and 2010 Medan election campaigns, within-
case analysis is conducted of the intervening processes and mechanisms leading to 
outcomes of voter mobilisation using ethno-communal identities.  
 
By tracing the processes within each case that leads to mobilisation, this study seeks 
to identify the influence of the hypothesised strategic-relational mechanism as a 
causal process between the independent variables (electoral rules, party regulations 
and decentralisation) and the dependent variable (voter mobilisation) (George and 
Bennett 2005: 206). In order to assess the role of this strategic-relational mechanism 
for voter mobilisation, this study divides the election process into four stages:  
- Candidate pairing: who do candidates choose to pair with and for what 
reasons? 
- Party nomination process: how important are parties nominations in 
mobilisation strategies?  
- Campaign appeals (actions and words): to what groups and on what basis do 
candidates seek to mobilise voters? 
- Voting results (voter mobilisation): to what extent did ethno-religious identities 
and party ties influence voting results?  
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By process-tracing of the strategies adopted by candidates during the four stages 
leading to voter mobilisation, this study establishes the limitation of the centripetalist 
hypothesis (H1) regarding decentralisation and voter mobilisation. By exploring this 
hypothesis, scope conditions can subsequently be placed on the plausibility of the 
strategic-relational theory, it’s hypothesised intervening mechanism and the role of 
ethno-communal identity in voter mobilisation. 
 
Data and Constraints 
In this study a mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach is adopted. 
This approach draws on a variety of primary and secondary sources to answer the 
two main research questions of this study. First, do macro-frameworks of electoral 
laws and party regulations significantly impact the mobilisation strategies of local 
political elites in the context of decentralisation? Second, under what conditions will 
candidates seek to mobilise various dimensions of their ethnic and social identities to 
appeal to a broader political base? The focal point for analysis is the case-studies of 
pilkada in Poso, Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra in Indonesia. 
 
The major source of evidence this case-study analysis consists of first-hand 
accounts of electoral processes by field researchers published in peer-reviewed 
journals or university-published texts. Sub-district electoral data sourced from 
Indonesian electoral authorities as well as census data on the ethnic and religious 
demography of sub-districts form the basis of statistical analysis.  
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Wherever possible, these sources have been supplemented with secondary 
accounts- either through reports from Indonesian news websites such as The 
Jakarta Post and local media sites, or through direct personal correspondence with 
field-researchers who witnessed the electoral processes. These sources have been 
critically analysed for bias, especially where quotes from candidates have been 
included. Limited first-hand data was available on particular aspects of electoral 
processes such as party nominations- especially when those processes involved 
candidates who were peripheral to the overall result of the elections. Subsequently, 
the ability to make generalisations about candidate behaviour during each stage of 
the electoral process is in many instances restricted to the mobilisation strategies of 
the top two candidate pairings.  
 
Language was a challenge in this study as many of the primary sources regarding 
candidate campaign platforms were in Bahasa Indonesian. As a consequence, only 
when an English translation could be obtained was this material used. Similar 
challenges existed with regard to secondary accounts of the identity appeals made 
by candidates as covered by various blogs and local Indonesian news-sites.  
 
As such, in studying the mobilisation strategies employed by various candidates, this 
study draws inferences about candidate profiles (ethno-religious identities, 
profession and associational connections) and the discourse and actions of 
candidates during each stage of the electoral process. Where possible, this 
information has been triangulated through multiple secondary sources.  
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Ch 4 Integration and Accommodation- Towards a Political Architecture of 
Centripetalist Decentralisation in Indonesia 
 
In the Reform Era after the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia’s interregnum President 
Habibie and law-makers in the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and House of 
Representatives (DPR) were confronted with the potential disintegration of the 
Indonesian Republic. After decades of centralised, military-supported rule, the 
demands of the reformasi movement that culminated with the fall of the Suharto 
regime prompted a period of rapid and radical revision of Indonesia’s political 
architecture. The subsequent reforms to electoral laws, party regulations and the 
territorial organisation of powers established Indonesia as a strongly centripetalist 
democracy that is also one of the most fiscally decentralized countries- unitary or 
federal- in the world (Hofman 2004: 18). This chapter outlines the evolution of 
Indonesia’s macro-frameworks from Independence to current centripetal electoral 
and party regulations of district elections.  
 
The chapter has four parts. Section one and two provide an outline of the political 
architecture prior to the fall of Suharto’s New Order in 1998. Section three describes 
the major elements of political engineering undertaken between 1999 and 2004. 
Section four assessing the implications of these macro-frameworks on the political 
strategy of elites in district level politics with reference to Poso District, Central 
Sulawesi and Medan District, North Sumatra. 
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Political Architecture 1945-1961 
The design of political institutions and territorial organisation of the state were central 
to nationalist debates after the Indonesia proclamation of independence from Dutch 
colonial rule in 1945. At issue was the way to construct national institutions and 
devolve de power to the regions in the manner most conducive to creating a “unified, 
single Indonesian identity” (Diprose 2008: 3). Proposals to ensure a share of power 
for the immense diversity of ethnic groups spread across Indonesia’s 10,000 islands 
primarily focused on whether the newly independent Indonesian state should be 
federal- a structure that the Dutch had used to manage centre-regional tensions- or 
unitary as preferred by many regional leaders who saw the Federation of Indonesia 
as mechanism of continuing colonial strategies of ‘divide and rule’ (Booth 2001).  
 
The Constitution of 1945 created a unitary state that “embodied the concept of a 
single nation” by providing no explicit recognition for ethnic groups (Bertrand 2008: 
206).6 However, it set the framework for the emergence of a strong, multiparty 
system that sought to integrate the concerns of periphery regions into national 
politics in Java. The cooptation of ethnic elites into the multi-party system ensured, 
however, that ethnicity was rarely mobilised as a national political cleavage- unless 
competing groups had pre-existing histories of hostility towards one another (Feith 
1962: 28). Whilst the party system may have played a role in mediating ethno-
communal and national loyalties during the early period after independence, the 
failure to adequately integrate the interests of outlying regions into central policy 
prompted the emergence of regionalist discontent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Article	  18	  refers	  to	  ‘regions’-­‐	  though the boundaries of these jurisdictions do not necessarily 
coincide with the territorial homeland of ethnic groups. 
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Claims of ‘Javanese Imperialism’ escalated into anti-regime rebellions in Sulawesi 
and Sumatra (the regional settings for the forthcoming case-studies) during the 
1950s (Diprose 2008: 5).  As Feith and Chauvel observe, the leaders of these 
rebellions synthesised an ideology of marginalisation by Java and Sumatra with 
‘local patriotisms’ built upon (but not limited to) ethnic and regional identities (Feith 
1962: 487; Chauvel 1996: 62). Demands for greater self-management were 
accommodated through the ratification of regional autonomy laws in the 1950s which 
were revoked in 1959 when Soekarno implemented ‘Guided Democracy’ (Legge 
1961: 209). The framework of the 1945 Constitution was retained during this period 
of attempted consociation between Soekarno, Islamic groups and the Indonesian 
Communist Party. It was adopted again after the military takeover of 1965 that 
launched the so-called ‘New Order’ regime of Suharto (Bertrand 2008: 206). 
 
Political Architecture under Suharto 
Following the instability that plagued the final years of the Soekarno regime, the New 
Order administration of Suharto from 1966 to 1998 utilised the integrationist 
framework of the 1945 Constitution to justify policies emphasising ‘stability’, 
centralisation and the development of a national consciousness. The ideological 
centrepiece of Suharto’s quest for harmony was Pancasila (the five principles)7- a 
strongly integrationist social philosophy which did not include any notion of 
kemajemukan (plurality) (Foulcher 2000: 400). Any sentiments related to SARA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  five	  principles	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia	  acknowledge	  commitment	  to	  belief	  in	  one	  God,	  a	  just	  and	  civilised	  humanity,	  national	  unity,	  and	  people’s	  rule	  through	  consultation	  and	  representation,	  to	  achieve	  social	  justice	  for	  all	  Indonesians.	  See	  Guinness,	  Patrick	  (1994)	  ‘Local	  Society	  and	  Culture’,	  in	  Hal	  Hill	  (ed),Indonesia's	  New	  Order,	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  St	  Leonards,	  p271.	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(suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan - ethnic, religious, racial or intergroup relations) 
were suppressed by officials in order to “prevent regional, linguistic, and religious 
differences from taking on a political force” (Hooker and Dick 1995: 2). The New 
Order’s SARA policy and ideology of Pancasila influenced the design of electoral 
regulations, party rules and the territorial division of authority aimed at 
comprehensively mediate and control the expression of ethno-cultural and religious 
diversity. 
 
Electoral Regulations 
The New Order retained the structures of two houses of parliament established by 
the 1945 Constitution. However, only 40 percent of parliament was openly elected, 
and multi-party politics were virtually banned by merging all opposition parties into 
two larger parties. Electoral laws provided for proportional representation election to 
the DPR- though these body acted primarily as ‘rubber-stamp’ institutions for 
Suharto’s Presidential decrees until 1998, when both the MPR and DPR grow 
increasingly assertive (Ziegenhain 2008: 5). 
 
At national level, President Suharto was ‘re-elected’ every three years through 
appointment by a vote of the two houses of parliament: the DPR and MPR, both of 
which were controlled by the state-run Golkar Party and representatives of the 
military who held 20 percent of seats up until 2004 (Ziegenhain 2008: 8).  
 
District and provincial assemblies, largely controlled by members of the ruling party 
Golkar and members of the de-concentrated military apparatus, were entitled to 
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nominate candidates for governors and bupati under the 1974 law. However, the 
ultimate power of appointment remained with the President and Home Minister until 
the 1999 reforms (Malley 2003). 
 
Provincial and district governments were appointed by Ministerial Officials in Jakarta, 
often at the direction of Suharto. Some input in this process was allowed by the 
relevant legislature (provincial, district) and the governor, though their proposals and 
nominations were never binding. Armed forces representatives were appointed to 
positions of Governor and bupati (district head) across the archipelago (Malley 1999). 
At provincial and district level, elections were held every four years but the central 
steering of regions was supported by the placement of military officers in all district 
and provincial assemblies (Guinness 1994: 269; Malley 1999: 76; Mietzner 2009).  
 
Parties Regulations 
The Suharto regime used Golkar (Golongan Karya, Party of the Functional Groups) 
as its primary electoral vehicle. All public officials at both national and sub-national 
level were required to join Golkar, effectively turning every government office into a 
Golkar branch and providing the regime party with a highly efficient machine for voter 
mobilization (Liddle, 1999: 43).  
 
Technically, Golkar was not considered a political party but rather a branch of the 
state. As such it was not subject to party regulations that tightly constrained political 
opposition. The party regulations of the New Order period forced secular nationalist 
parties to unite under the banner of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian 
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Democratic Party, PDI), while numerous Muslim parties were fused into the Partai 
Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP).  
 
No alternative avenues of political expression existed at a local level as the 
‘opposition’ parties during the New Order, PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – 
Indonesian Democratic Party) and the PPP were not permitted to establish branches 
at lower administrative levels (Ufen 2011: 14). Subsequently, by the time of the fall of 
Suharto in 1998, Golkar was the only party with a local party apparatus, severely 
disadvantaging the local organisational development of major parties to this day 
(Hellmann 2011: 123). 
 
Territorial Organisation of Power 
Administratively, the New Order increasingly centralised national administration in 
Jakarta, promoting ‘development’ as the cornerstone of national stability, economic 
progress and prosperity. The era was characterised by top-down decision-making 
and administrative deconcentration to Ministerial Field Offices where local interests 
were rarely embraced. Economic policy was implemented through centrally driven 
Five-Year Development Plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun – Repelita) 
(Hooker and Dick 1995: 3). A large proportion of the ‘spoils’ of development flowed 
into the hands of the military or ‘cronies’ with ties to Jakarta (Guinness 1994: 64). 
 
A legal foundation for central political control of regional governments was 
established through the enactment of Law No. 5, 1974 on “Government in the 
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Regions” which enabled the Suharto regime to ‘drop’ its preferred candidates from 
the centre into regional positions (Fitrani, Hofman et al. 2005). The primary link 
between regional governments and the central administration in Jakarta was the 
diffusion of Golkar  as an outgrowth of President Suharto’s authoritarian regime. 
Rather than develop organically, Golkar’s expansion to the outlying regions was 
linked closely to the state. As a consequence the ‘party on the ground’ was 
essentially “identical with parts of the highly centralist New Order administration” 
(Ufen 2011: 14). The strongly centripetal nature of the party system and limited 
autonomy for regional governments fuelled the development of regionalist sentiment 
in the final years of the Suharto regime. Demands for regional autonomy 
subsequently became one of the central elements of the reformasi movement that 
helped to bring down the Suharto regime in 1998.  
 
Political Engineering after Suharto 
With the fall of Suharto and subsequent transition to democratic rule, reforms to 
Indonesia’s political architecture have sought to balance the ethnic and regional 
diversity of the regions through strongly centripetalist electoral and party laws, as 
well as the substantive decentralisation of a wide-range of fiscal and political powers 
to district governments.  
 
Electoral Regulations 
Executive 
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Since the fall of Suharto, electoral regulations for Presidential, Governor and District 
Head (bupati) elections have generally followed the same reform process and 
centripetalist tendencies. 
 
The initial 1999 electoral regulations only marginally shifted the responsibility for 
election of national, provincial and district executive (Reilly 2006: 10). According to 
the 1999 legislation, the President, Provincial Governors and District Heads were all 
respectively appointed by democratically elected parliaments/assemblies at national, 
provincial and local level- a practice that existed at the national during the New Order 
period. Due to regulations requiring all candidates to be nominated by parties, the 
appointment of the executive was strongly party-based. Reports of party branches 
selling nominations were rife during this early period (Hadiz 2004).  
 
The subsequent reforms created for the 2004 Presidential election facilitated the 
‘normalisation’ of Indonesian politics (Aspinall 2005) whilst maintaining the strongly 
centripetalist tendencies of Suharto era political arrangements.  
 
The new 2004 electoral regulations had two key elements, paralleled in the Law on 
Local Governance (Law 32/2004): 
- All candidates were required to be nominated by parties that had received 
15% of the votes in past elections or occupied 15% of the seats in the 
relevant parliament (national, provincial, district) (Ufen 2011). Electoral 
regulations have therefore retained a strong centripetalist role for parties and 
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party organization in the selection of candidates, their running-mates and the 
campaign for popular election. 
- Candidates were required to be nominated in pairs (President and Vice-
President, Governor and Deputy Governor, District Head and Deputy Head). 
This centripetalist trend was apparently instituted in the hope of major parties 
nominating pairs combining a Javanese with outer Island candidates (Reilly 
2006: 10).  
One difference between national and kabupaten (regional) regulations was the size 
of voter threshold required to take office. In Presidential elections, in order to avoid a 
second-round run-off, a first-round winner was required to win an absolute majority 
across the country/province, with at least 20 percent of those votes in half of all 
provinces (Reilly 2006: 10). At the regional (provincial and district) level, a plurality of 
40 percent is required to win election, with a second ‘run-off’ election occurring 
between the two highest polling candidates within two months if no candidate 
achieves more than 40 percent of the vote. The 2004 electoral regulations therefore 
introduced direct popular rather than proxy elections, institutionalising similar party 
dependency and candidate pairing requirements at both national and regional level. 
A subsequent 2009 Constitutional Court ruling permitted candidates to participate in 
local elections independent of parties in district elections, though few candidates 
have participated in pilkada without party nomination (Buehler 2010).  
 
Legislature 
Elections for parliamentary bodies have similarly democratised but have not changed 
significantly in the regulations around election. In an unusual hybrid system of party 
list proportional representation, the initial electoral regulations created in 1999 for the 
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election of the DPR and MPR provided for a ‘personal vote’ option in which locally-
popular candidates would increase their chances of gaining a list seat (Reilly 2006: 
9). After complications, the model and the automatic allocation of seats to the military 
implicit within it, was revised to a more conventional ‘open list’ proportional 
representation for the 2004 elections, with a proportion of seats elected through 
multi-member constituencies. A similar system is used for the election of members to 
provincial and district assemblies (Aspinall 2005: 138). 
 
Party Regulations 
With the transition to multi-party democracy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, 
Indonesia’s political reformers have sought to cultivate a broad-based party system 
through a range of incentives for the development of aggregative parties. For 
instance, in order to qualify for registration, parties must have offices in 60 percent of 
provinces and 50 percent of districts within those provinces- a strongly centripetalist 
attempt to prevent regional or ethnic parties from developing. The same provision 
applies at the district and provincial level, where regional parties are banned from 
competing in elections for either assemblies (Reilly 2006: 14).  
 
These centripetalist party regulations have pushed some parties to develop a local 
party apparatus. The PDI-P, for instance, apparently has branches in 63,000 of 
Indonesia’s 77,000 villages (Ufen 2011: 17). However, despite the clear incentives to 
develop local branches, most Indonesian parties remain “heavily top-down… with 
charismatic leaders in Jakarta deciding on policies and the next strategic steps” 
(Ufen 2011: 9). Faced with financing constraints and the emergence of an industry 
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“of pollsters, consultants and of candidates with weak links to political parties”, the 
role of parties in candidate vetting has been increasingly undermined within local 
political processes (Hellmann 2011: 136).  
  
Territorial Organisation: Decentralisation 
The final element of political engineering in the years following the fall of the New 
Order regime has been the territorial reorganisation of the Indonesian state. Two 
major reforms form the pillar of these reforms: Law 22 of 1999 on regional 
governance and Law No. 25, 1999 concerning ‘The Fiscal Balance Between the 
Central Government and the Regions’. 
 
Combined, these two laws provided for a significant shift in management of state 
resources across a broad range of areas to Indonesia’s 400-plus districts and cities 
(kabupaten). Administratively, Law 22 of 1999 on regional governance devolved all 
government functions to sub-provincial governments with the exception of national 
defence, international relations, justice, police, monetary policy, development 
planning, religion and finance. Key functions included the provision of health, 
education, environmental and infrastructure services, as well as “any function not 
explicitly reserved for the center or the provinces” (Hofman and Kaiser 2006: 93)8. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In	  some	  instances,	  lack	  of	  clarity	  regarding	  specific	  administrative	  functions	  of	  regional	  
governments	  created	  confusion	  and	  tension	  with	  central	  officials.	  As	  Turner	  and	  Hofman	  observe,	  
the	  assignment	  of	  centre-­‐local	  responsibilities	  in	  the	  initial	  decentralisation	  laws	  were	  often	  
ambiguous	  or	  conflicting.	  Later	  laws	  such	  as	  the	  forestry	  law	  and	  civil	  service	  law	  entirely	  ignored	  the	  
concept	  of	  regional	  autonomy,	  whilst	  there	  were	  explicit	  efforts	  later	  to	  re-­‐centralize	  some	  
responsibilities	  such	  as	  hiring	  and	  firing	  of	  local	  bureaucrats.	  For	  a	  fuller	  discussion	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
confusion	  embedded	  within	  Law	  22	  and	  25	  see	  Turner,	  M.	  O.	  P.	  (2003).	  Decentralisation	  in	  indonesia:	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The district or region (kabupaten) was therefore provided the primary role in service 
delivery, bypassing the provinces out of fear that strong provincial government would 
encourage the resurgence of regional autonomy movements- especially in Sulawesi 
and Sumatra- quashed in the 1950s and 1960s (Nordholt 2005).  
 
The fiscal arrangements of decentralisation were set out in Law 25 of 1999, which 
revised the entirety of Indonesia’s intergovernmental fiscal framework. The law 
replaced the system of earmarked or specific purpose grants that characterized the 
Suharto era with a series of other revenue sources, the two major elements of which 
are general allocation grants and shared taxes. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the size 
of fiscal transfers through these mechanisms almost doubled the regional share of 
government spending from 14.9 percent of national spending in 2000 to 27.50 
percent in 2002. 
  
Figure 2 Sub-National Spending in the State Budget FY 2000 to 2005. Source 
Suhendra 2006: 6. 
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Imperative to the centripetalist design of the fiscal decentralisation initiative was the 
institutionalization of regional dependency upon transfers from the government in 
Jakarta. Though district governments enjoy new spending powers, central authorities 
retained control over the rate and base of most substantive taxes. Some autonomy 
was provided for expenditures of locally-collected revenues, though these sources 
typically only constitute around 5 percent of the average local budget (Hofman and 
Kaiser 2006). As demonstrated in Figure 3, the laws therefore institutionalized heavy 
transfer dependence of district governments on central government transfers- a 
deliberate strategy of fiscal vertical accountability aimed at militating localised 
rebellion that emerged during the transition period of 1998-2001. 
 
 
Figure 3 The Contribution of Intergovernmental Transfers to Sub-National 
Revenues. Source Suhendra 2006: 6 
As part of the shift towards localised expenditures, the fiscal decentralisation laws 
reassigned two-thirds of central civil servants who had previously worked in central 
government field offices to the regional government- integrating them into the newly 
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reconstituted district governments (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). District governments 
are now responsible for employing three-quarters of Indonesia’s civil servants, with 
Law 22 providing district establishment and especially bupati with broad autonomy to 
determine the size and specific projects of the local civil-service (Hofman and Kaiser 
2006). 
 
With the Presidency of Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2004, further reforms to the 
decentralisation framework were made. Law no. 32/2004 on Regional Government 
and Law no. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and 
Regional Government entirely revised the 1999 laws on regional autonomy, 
cultivating intergovernmental relations and increasing the mandate of the local 
executive vis a vis the district assembly (Malley 2004). Law 33 revised the 
framework of regional collaboration by removing lacunae in the 2001 legislation that 
permitted erection of barriers by district executives to trade across district and 
provincial boundaries. The legislation therefore sought to facilitate ‘harmonious 
relations’ between regions and with the national government by strengthening the 
role of provincial governors in ‘guidance and supervision’ of district governments and 
creating new mechanisms of national government oversight (Article 1 in Bunte 2009: 
111). A new mechanism of vertical intervention was also provided to the national 
government to unilaterally suspend district bupati for corruption or if they threatened 
public order (Bunte 2009: 112).  
 
Law 32 strengthened the fiscal authority of district heads to control financial 
management within their respective territories, to authorise expenditure and to set 
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priorities within the budget (Article 156 and 192 in Buehler 2010: 278). These 
changes were achieved by substantially reducing the autonomy of local assemblies 
(DPRD), weakening their role in oversight of the local executive (district heads and 
their deputies) (Buehler 2010: 279).  
 
The final change in the 2004 legislation, reflecting the stabilisation of the national 
civilian polity that occurred with the first direct Presidential elections in 2004 (Aspinall 
2005; Nordholt and van Klinken 2007: 15), was to democratise the election of heads 
of kabupaten (governors as well as district heads). Law 32 subsequently removed 
the district assembly from the process of election and dismissal of the local executive, 
with the objective of shifting power away from party bosses who were exploiting 
party nomination roles for personal and political benefit (Nordholt and van Klinken 
2007: 17; Bunte 2009: 112). Combined, the 1999 and 2004 reform processes 
significantly altered both the territorial organisation of power within the Indonesian 
state as well as the frameworks of electoral and party laws. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the fall of the Suharto New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has undergone a 
significant reformation of electoral laws, party regulations and the territorial 
organisation of the state. The design of each of these institutions have generally 
continued the strong centripetalist orientation of the Suharto era, with incentives 
embedded within electoral and party regulations aimed at integrating regional and 
ethnic constituencies into national parties and cultivating cross-communal pairing. Of 
particular significance is the territorial reorganisation of the state that occurred with 
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the 2001 decentralisation of all major government functions to district administrations 
with the exception of national defence, justice, police, monetary policy, development 
planning, religion and finance (Hofman and Kaiser 2006: 93).  
 
Given Indonesia’s strongly centripetalist macro-frameworks of electoral and party 
regulations, it is evident that the country provides a useful context through which to 
assess the processes whereby strategic incentives of macro-political frameworks 
impact processes and outcomes of ethno-communal mobilisation at the district level.  
To explore these propositions, a plausibility probe of the strategic-relational theory of 
decentralisation and ethno-communal mobilisation will now be conducted through 
case-studies of candidate strategies and voter mobilisation in recent electoral 
campaigns in Poso Central Sulawesi and Medan, North Sumatra. 
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Ch 5: Poso, Central Sulawesi- Elite Strategy in a Deeply Divided District 
 
District Background 1998-2004 
The district of Poso located in the eastern Indonesian province of Central Sulawesi is 
a small, predominantly rural region. Poso became renowned during the colonial era 
when the indigenous Pamona people converted on mass to Protestantism, making it 
one of the most successful Christian missionary areas in the Dutch East Indies 
(Aragon 2000). The completion of the Trans-Sulawesi Highway in the 1980s made 
Poso district a major migrant destination (van Klinken 2007a: 78). The district 
subsequently experienced the highest proportion of population change of any region 
in Central Sulawesi, with a migrant share in 1998 of around 18 percent compared 
with 10 percent nationally (Braithwaite, Braithwaite et al. 2010: 245). These migrant 
in-flows saw the percentage of Christians in the district decline from 38 percent in 
1980 to 32 percent in 1998 at the end of the New Order. Changes in Poso’s religious 
composition raised concerns amongst local Christian political elites of “demographic 
threats to the historically Christian domination of the highlands” (Brown and Diprose 
2009: 7).  
 
Poso’s changing religious demographics led to the practice of religious identity 
alternation in the control of the district executive from the 1980s, ostensibly as a 
mechanism of sharing power and mediating conflict between communal elites 
(Braithwaite, Braithwaite et al. 2010: 245). In the mid-1980s the position of district 
head was held by a Christian, followed by an ethnic Tojo Muslim in the 1990s 
(Aragon 2007: 51). However, this practice ceased after the fall of Suharto in 1998 
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when the Muslim incumbent supported the appointment of a local Muslim bureaucrat 
to his soon-to-vacated position as district head (bupati) (van Klinken 2007a: 80). 
With the announcement in December 1998 that the new electoral laws for the 1999 
Presidential election would also empower district assemblies to appoint district 
bupati, minor scuffles between youths escalated into a series of religious clashes 
forcing intervention by Central Sulawesi provincial military (HRW 2002: 4).  
 
Between 1998 and early 2002 this pattern of bureaucratic competition and 
religiously-based mobilisation by local political elites recurred repeatedly, escalating 
into a protracted communal conflict involving South-East Asian terrorist networks 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Laskar Jihad (LJ) (ICG 2004; ICG 2005; ICG 2010). This 
period of large-scale communal mobilisation ceased with the Malino Declaration of 
December 2001 which brokered a peace agreement between the primary militias 
and political elites involved in the conflict (HRW 2002: 28-29). At least 1,000 people 
died during the conflict and more than 147,000 were displaced (van Klinken 2007a; 
Aragon 2008; McRae 2008; Varshney 2010).  
 
Of the locals involved, Christians were primarily from Poso’s main indigenous group- 
the Protestant Pamona people- as well as smaller ethnic groups from the rural 
highlands outside Poso township (Diprose 2008: 23). The Muslim groups engaged in 
the conflict were largely ethnic Bugis and Gorantalese originating from South 
Sulawesi, predominantly resident in Poso’s coastal urban sub-districts. 
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Seemingly in an attempt to alleviate the communal tensions and elite competition at 
the centre of the Poso conflict, the district underwent two re-divisions (evident in 
Figure 4) by Jakarta authorities after the initial outbreak of violence in 1998: the first 
in 1999 to create Tojo Una Una district (Aragon 2007: 51) and the second in 2003 to 
create Morowali district (Tirtosudarmo 2006: 15). Poso is now comprised of an 
ethnically and religiously mixed population of around 200,000 people, of which 
according to the most recent census figures around 65 percent are Christian and 30 
percent Muslim (BPS 2004b)9. 
 
 
Figure 4 Poso after excluding Tojo Una Una and Morowali districts 
It is within this context of a district recovering from recent religious communal 
conflict- yet retaining a large proportion of (predominantly urban) Muslims- that this 
study is framed.  
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  a	  census	  has	  not	  been	  conducted	  since	  re-­‐districting	  in	  2003.	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Following the introduction of direct local elections (pilkada) for the district executive 
in 2004, the first Poso pilkada in 2005 was seen as a potential spark for further 
ethno-communal violence (ICG 2004)- a scenario which did not, and has not, 
eventuated despite provocative bombings and kidnappings linked to terrorist 
networks JI and LJ (ICG 2005; ICG 2010). The Poso 2005 pilkada therefore provides 
a useful case-study in which to test how macro-frameworks of electoral laws, party 
regulations and decentralisation shape strategies of voter mobilisation adopted by 
candidates and local political elites and their relationship to voting patterns in a 
religiously polarised district (Diprose 2009: 102).  
 
It proceeds in three parts. It first analyses the election process (candidate pairing, 
party nominations, campaigning) and then assesses the role of parties, religious 
identities and ethnic identities in influencing voting outcomes. It then concludes, 
emphasising that the classical centripetalist theory is insufficient to explain the 
strategic choices about relational ties made by candidates, political elites and voters 
in Poso’s 2005 post-conflict election. 
 
Poso Pilkada: 2005 
Five candidate pairs (10 candidates) were nominated for election in the 2005 pilkada. 
Each candidate pair brought a diverse range of affiliations across major religious and 
ethnic groups within Poso. As forecast by the classical centripetalist theory, the 
intense level of intra-group competition in the 2005 Poso pilkada motivated 
candidates to develop strategies aimed at mobilising voters across various ethnic 
and religious constituencies within the district. 
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Candidate Pairing 
The 2004 regulations for district elections mandated that nominations for the local 
executive include a candidate for bupati and a deputy. In accordance with classical 
centripetalist theory, the requirement of candidate pairing motivated all candidates to 
organise across religious community boundaries. Consequently, in 2005 five slates 
of candidate pairs nominated in Poso for the positions of bupati/deputy head. Each 
candidate pairing nominated both a Muslim and a Christian.10 Three had a Christian 
in the bupati position with a Muslim deputy, while the other two pairings had a 
Muslim as bupati and a Christian as deputy. 
  
This pairing strategy was identified by many observers as vital to mitigating 
persistent tensions about future communal exclusion, with the head of the Poso 
Electoral Commission noting that “all of society wanted such combinations” 
(Interview in Brown and Diprose 2009: 13). However, underwriting the ‘rainbow’ 
pairing strategy was a clear recognition amongst all candidates that with multiple 
candidate-pairs nominated from each of the major religious communities “even a 
Christian candidate would find it hard to win… without any Muslim backing” (Brown 
and Diprose 2009: 13). The centripetalist pairing regulation intended to motivate 
cross-communal pairing was therefore successful in engendering a certain level of 
inter-communal cooperation. However, a variety of other strategic factors beyond 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The same candidate pairing strategy was subsequently adopted in the 2010 Poso 
pilkada, though all tickets were led by Christians with Muslim running mates. See 
ICG (2010). Indonesia: Preventing Violence in Local Elections. Asia Report. Jakarta, 
International Crisis Group, Sukarsono, A. (2011). Poso Pilkada 2005 and 2010. G. 
McCarthy. Jakarta, International Crisis Group..	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religious affiliation also entered into bupati candidates’ specific choice of running-
mates. 
Figure 5 Profiles of candidate pairs, 2005 Poso Pilkada. Source Brown 2009: 12
 
Politicking on the basis of ethnicity was closely related to religious self-identity. With 
the partition of Poso in 1999 and 2004, the mostly Christian Pamona ethnic group 
now constituted the largest voting block in the district (BPS 2004b; Sukarsono 2011). 
Consequently, in addition to electoral competition and demographic realities 
necessitating cross-religious candidate pairing, all tickets also nominated a member 
of the indigenous Pamona ethnic group- either as bupati or deputy. The outcomes of 
this pairing strategy for voter mobilisation in Pamona majority sub-districts will be 
examined further. However, additionally the professional and public service profile of 
candidates also seem to have influenced choices about running-mate selection.  
 
Six of the ten district head and deputy candidates were civil servants with strong 
links to the local bureaucratic, religious and business elites that dominated district 
politics during the late New Order and beyond. Most candidates had held positions in 
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
53	  of	  102	  
the district administration during the earlier period of fiscal decentralisation (2001-
2004), including the present bupati incumbent, Muin Pusaden. 
 
The ultimately successful candidate-pair comprised a retired local police officer of 
mixed Chinese, Manado and Pamona ancestry - Piet Ingkiriwang - and a wealthy 
local businessmen, Muthalib Rimi. Both had close links to the district bureaucracy 
(Brown and Diprose 2009: 11; Sukarsono 2011). Dede Atmawijaya, a high-ranking 
army officer in Poso credited with acting impartially in protecting both religious 
groups during the conflict, was the only major exception to local elite dominance of 
candidate nominations. Dede was Sundanese Muslim, though he apparently had 
weak religious affiliations. He paired with Lis Sigilipu, a well-connected member of 
the Central Sulawesi Christian (GKST) and a former Golkar activist (Brown and 
Diprose 2009: 11). 
 
Beyond the expectations of classical centripetalism, all candidates therefore made 
strategic calculations about pairing based on the relational ties, personal and group 
identities and prior bureaucratic service of their deputy. This feature of candidate 
pairing was a critical determinant in subsequent strategies of voter mobilisation 
employed by candidate pairs. 
 
Party nomination process 
Despite inclusive candidate-pairing, several tickets were nominated by parties with 
explicit religious affiliations. For instance, two sets of bupati candidates - the local 
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Christian police officer Piet Ingkiriwang and the incumbent Muslim bupati Muin 
Pusadan - sought nominations from national parties with local reputations for being 
strongly linked to Poso’s Christian and Muslim communities respectively (Brown and 
Diprose 2009: 11). Ingkiriwang and Rimi were nominated by the Partai Damai 
Sejahtera (Prosperity for Peace-PDS), a party dominated by Christians in the Poso 
branch and which held the majority of seats in the local district assembly. Pusadan 
and Walenta were nominated by a coalition of four Islamic parties. However, only the 
Partai Bintang Reformas (The Reform State Party- PBR) had any serious local 
presence with a number of members in the district assembly (Interview with DPRD 
chairman in Brown and Diprose 2009: 6).  
 
Dede Atmawijaya’s deputy- Lis Sigilipu- had long-running ties as an activist for the 
Poso branch of Golkar. However, the current secretary of the district assembly, Edy 
Bungkundapu and his running-mate Awad Alamri were able to secure the Golkar 
nomination by leveraging contacts in the local bureaucracy (Brown and Diprose 2009: 
11). Sowolino and Latjare were nominated by Partai Patriot Pancasila- an off-shoot 
of a Golkar youth organisation that had several members in the local district 
assembly (DPRD). Dede and Lis consequently obtained nomination from national 
parties Partai Democrat (PD), PDI-P and Partai Pelopor- none of which had a strong 
presence in the twenty-five member DPRD (Interview with DPRD chairman in Brown 
and Diprose 2009: 6). Party nominations, whilst necessary to declare candidacy, 
were therefore mixed in the organisational benefit that they provided to candidates.  
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Campaign appeals (actions and words) 
Despite the varying degrees of religious affiliation, both personal and institutional, 
amongst the candidates, they all sought to frame their role in the religious conflict 
and local politics of 1998-2003 as positively as possible. The successful Christian-
Pamona candidate, Ingkiriwang, was most effective at distancing himself from the 
conflict as he entered Poso’s political scene just six months prior to the election 
(Sukarsono 2011). Ingkiriwang also stressed his ‘newness’ and ‘clean slate’ from the 
local corruption and mismanagement of the early decentralisation period of 1999-
2004 and promised stricter security measures for the district to prevent terrorist 
attacks (Interview with activist in Brown and Diprose 2009: 13). In addition to 
emphasising religious inclusivity, candidates also activated non-religious dimensions 
of their identities to forge connections across other communal groups.  
 
As a consequence of the resurgence of traditional customary institutions (adat) in the 
years following the collapse of the Suharto regime, newly reconstructed ‘traditional’ 
systems of law and village governance have played a greater role at the sub-district, 
district and provincial level throughout Indonesia (van Klinken 2007b; Tyson 2010). 
In addition to actively facilitating local peacebuilding and resettlement of displaced 
people from the earlier period of conflict (UNDP 2007: 70), decentralisation had also 
prompted the political resurgence of ‘traditional’ authorities. Adat and tribal rituals 
increasingly “operate as tools or even as branches of government”, and local youth 
activists have come to participate actively in district pilkada campaigns by mobilising 
members of their communities on behalf of candidates supportive of their communal 
concerns (Li 2007: 363; Tyson 2010).  
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In the 2005 district election, candidates therefore sought to build a support-base 
amongst Poso’s increasingly politically assertive ethnic Pamona community. Piet 
Ingkiriwang emphasised the Pamona dimension of his mixed Chinese, Manado and 
Pamona heritage to appeal to adat and described himself as a ‘son of the soil’ from 
the local ‘indigenous’ Poso community (Interview with activist in Brown and Diprose 
2009: 366). Sources suggest that similar appeals to ‘indigeneity’ were made by 
Pusaden’s deputy candidate Osbert Walenta. Frans Sowolino campaign as the “fully 
Pamona” candidate. However, despite Sowolino’s strong involvement in local 
Pamona schools and regional university, Pamona chiefs reportedly did not mobilise 
significantly on behalf of either Walenta or Sowolino (Sukarsono 2011). Instead, it 
appears adat leaders made strategic choices regarding the mobilisation of their 
tribes-people, rather than simply mobilising sub-clan identities as predicted by 
classical centripetalist theory.  
 
It is evident from the campaign period that adat chiefs strategically assessed the 
various identities and social ties of candidates and their running-mates prior to 
mobilising their community- a level of agency not envisaged by classical 
centripetalist theory. Indeed, a distinction was seemingly made between a ‘fully 
Pamona’ candidate (Sowolino) with minimal support in other constituencies, and a 
mixed-heritage Chinese-Manado-Pamona candidate (Ingkiriwang) with strong links 
to members of the district assembly, local bureaucrats and business interests and 
the Pamona running-mate of the district incumbent, Muin Pusaden (Sukarsono 2011). 
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Their judgements about the relational bonds of candidates and their running-mates 
had important implications for outcomes of voter mobilisation.  
 
Election Results 
Voting returns in the 2005 Poso pilkada are an ambiguous indicator of how the 
strategic decisions taken by candidate-pairs to mobilise a variety of constituencies, 
identities and social ties impacted voter choice at the ballot box. The election was 
won convincingly by a Christian candidate Piet Ingkiriwang and his Muslim deputy, 
Muthalib Rimi with the pair heading the election results in every sub-district in Poso 
except two. The pair received 42.6 percent of the vote overall- 20 points higher than 
the second-place candidate pair of Frans Sowolino and Kahar Latjare. However, 
below this general result is a much more complex web of relationships between 
religion, ethnicity and party nominations in determining this election outcome.  
 
Figure 6 2005 Poso election results by sub-district. Source Brown 2009: 15 
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Religious Identities and Voting 
Assessing the impact of individual religious identity upon voting outcomes is 
speculative in the absence of individual-level data regarding voting intentions. 
However, it does appear that Christian majority sub-districts were more likely to 
support candidate pairs that nominated a Christian in the bupati position. Ingkiriwang, 
Sowolino and Bungkundapu all received a larger proportion of votes in Christian 
majority sub-districts than either of the tickets headed by Muslims- which ranked last 
(Muin/Osbet) and second last (Dede/Lies) respectively in these sub-districts. 
 
However, the inverse relationship of Christian performance in Muslim majority 
districts was not as clear. The only two sub-districts where Piet Inkiriwang did not top 
the poll was in Poso Kota and Poso Pesisir, both of which are majority Muslim 
neighborhoods. In both of these areas, the Muslim incumbent Muin Pusaden- who by 
many accounts had been complicit in later waves of anti-Christian violence during 
Poso’s conflict period- received the largest number of votes. 
 
However, the strength of the pro-Muslim vote in Muslim-majority sub-districts was 
not pronounced, with the two Christian-led tickets of Edy/Awad and Piet Ingkiriwang 
also polling strongly in these Muslim majority districts. These tickets received 24.2 
percent and 20.2 percent of Poso’s Muslim vote respectively - only a few points 
behind Pusaden/Osbet who received 29.4 percent.  
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It is noteworthy to contrast Ingkiriwang & Thalib- who received 49.8 percent of the 
vote from Christian majority districts with the incumbent pairing of Pusaden & 
Walenta, who were only able to secure 29.4 percent of votes from Muslim majority 
districts, notwithstanding their nomination by a number of Islamic parties. Given that 
most accounts of the conflict suggest Pusaden was complicit in condoning later 
waves of anti-Christian violence by LK operatives (HRW 2002), his low polling even 
amongst Poso’s Muslims underlines the extent to which many Muslims saw him as 
devoid of merit despite his religious affiliation (Brown and Diprose 2009: 15).  
 
Party Nominations and Voting 
The divisions shown in the voting results amongst Poso’s Muslim community 
suggest as well that rather than religious identity alone, party nominations also 
played an important role in influencing the election choice of voters. Whilst Pusaden 
topped the poll in Poso’s Muslim majority sub-districts, the Golkar nominated ticket 
comprising a Christian bureaucrat (Edy) and Muslim deputy performed almost as 
strongly in these districts. The margins of difference in voting results between the 
Pusaden pairing and Edy in Muslim majority sub-districts was under 7 percent in 
Poso Kota and an even slimmer at 1.6 percent in Poso Pesisir.  
 
Indeed, the Golkar-nominated ticket of Dede Bungkundapu and Alamri had almost 
twice the voting support of the alternative Muslim-led pairing of Atmawijaya and 
Sigilipu in Muslim-majority sub-districts. This result suggests that while Dede may 
have had a reputation amongst some voters for a balanced approach to policing 
during the conflict (Brown and Diprose 2009: 12), the weak local presence of his 
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major nominating party (PDI-P) in Poso resulted in the Golkar Party apparatus more 
effectively mobilising Poso’s urban Muslims on behalf of Edy Atmawijaya and Lis 
Sigilipu.  
 
Rather than simply making calculations about religious identity affiliation of 
candidates as predicted by classical centripetalist theory, sub-district voting data 
suggests that voters in Poso’s ethnically diverse, predominantly Muslim urban areas 
voted primarily “on individual reasons rather than group loyalty” (Sukarsono 2011). 
However, the strong performance of the Edy-Lis pairing in Muslim urban sub-districts 
did not extend to Christian-majority districts where this candidate received only 9.8 
percent of the vote. This suggests that just as Poso’s Muslims seem to have 
supported a Christian bupati candidate on the basis of the Golkar-endorsement, 
Christian Pamona voters were reluctant to provide Bungkundapu with support, 
despite his claimed Pamona heritage. This may be a function of the strong 
organisational apparatus of the Partai Damai Sejahtera in Christian areas, which 
delivered strong polling outcomes in all Pamona majority sub-districts. Mobilisation 
on the basis of a candidates’ nominating party and the respective strength of their 
organisational apparatus may therefore have had a more determinant impact on 
voting behaviour in Poso’s 2005 election, at least in Muslim sub-districts, than 
concerns about the religious affiliation of candidate pairings. 
  
Ethnic Identities and Voting 
Whilst the ascriptive religious identity of candidates was not a strong determinant of 
voting patterns, broader relational ties and networks were more significant in 
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determining the support of the indigenous Pamona, Poso’s largest ethnic group. 
Frans Sowolino’s was unability to secure sufficient campaign finance and build 
networks across other constituencies, especially within the local bureaucracy and 
district assembly. This meant that he was unable to secure the majority of his 
Pamona community (Sukarsono 2011). In the four Pamona majority sub-district 
(Utara, Selatan, Timur and Barat) Sowolino ranked second to the mixed descent 
Pamona candidate Ingkiriwang, who received over 50 percent of the vote in all but 
Pamona Selatan. Even in that sub-district, Sowolino’s own village, Ingkiriwang 
received 38.2 percent of the vote- 2.9 percent more than Sowolino (35.3 percent). In 
contrast, the incumbent Muin Pusaden and his Pamona deputy Osbert Walenta 
polled poorly in all four Pamona sub-districts- receiving less than 10 percent of the 
vote despite the cross-ethnic pairing. A similarly weak voting result was recorded for 
Dede and his Pamona deputy, Lis Sigilipu who lacked a significant organisational 
apparatus in these sub-districts. Consequently, the better networked and financed 
Ingkiriwang won the majority of the Pamona vote in the 2005 pilkada. Sowolino 
placed second, a long way behind the winning pair.  
 
As data on individual voter intention and village processes of mobilisation amongst 
adat (customary) leaders is limited, conclusions about the strategic calculations 
made by local elites in supporting candidates can only be inferred from the voting 
results. Indeed, the reservations voiced by a number of Pamona chiefs to 
International Crisis Group field analysts about the limited appeal of Sowolino is 
reflected by his lack of support in Pamona-majority sub-districts- a result similarly 
seen in his 2010 pilkada performance (Sukarsono 2011). This suggests that village-
level mobilisation by adat 
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influenced not simply by intra-ethnic competition or the strength of ethnic ties. 
Mobilisation might also have been influenced by broader calculations about the 
viability and appeal of certain candidates across a variety of constituencies within the 
district. In other words, in the absence of any threat presented to the comparative 
political power of their ethnic group through the pairing strategy of all the tickets, adat 
leaders and youth activists ultimately supported the candidate from their community 
most likely of winning the election. 
 
Analysis and Conclusion 
At all stages of the electoral process, Poso’s 2005 pilkada demonstrates the 
limitations of the classical centripetalist theory in explaining outcomes of voter 
mobilisation. The candidate pairing regulation in the 2004 electoral legislation 
successfully achieved cooperation between elites on the basis of religious identity. 
However, in addition to religious affiliation, the pairing strategy employed by 
candidates operated simultaneously across several dimensions of personal and 
communal association, including experience in the local bureaucracy. Beyond the 
expectations of the classical centripetalist theory of decentralisation, the successful 
candidates in Poso’s 2005 pilkada reflexively adapted their strategies, identities and 
approaches (Jessop 2001: 1224) to enable voter mobilisation. As a result, the focus 
of these mobilisation strategies were not simply ascriptive group identities (ala 
classical centripetalist theory) but were tied to various dimensions of social linkage 
between candidates and voters.  
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In addition to strategic identity mobilisation by candidates, Poso’s 2005 election 
results also suggest the potential for voter reflexivity- whether influenced by adat 
chiefs or the local organisational apparatus of a party. For instance, Muslim voters 
strongly supported a Christian candidate seemingly on the basis of his linkages to 
Golkar. Meanwhile, ethnic elites and voters did not support the ‘fully Pamona’ 
candidate Frans Sowolino as he was perceived as unlikely to win the election and 
therefore deliver benefits to the community (Sukarsono 2011). Rather, voters in 
Pamona majority sub-districts strongly supported the mixed-heritage Pamona police 
officer, Piet Ingkiriwang. The proposed strategic-relational mechanism by which 
macro-frameworks (electoral/party regulations, decentralisation) impact elite strategy 
formation is therefore analytically necessary to explain the outcome of voter 
mobilisation in post-conflict Poso. In the context of strong competition and 
centripetalist electoral and party regulations, cooperation across religious 
communities has become a necessary but insufficient condition for electoral success. 
Rather, additional factors such as the breadth of a candidates’ identity repertoire, 
their inter-communal support and a candidate pairs record and reputation in the 
wider community strongly determined the outcome of voter mobilisation. Whether the 
same interaction between strategic incentives and relational ties is equally 
determinant in explaining patterns of identity mobilisation in a larger, more ethnically 
heterogeneous city will be assessed in the next case-study of the 2010 Medan 
elections.   
 
 
 
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
64	  of	  102	  
Ch 6: Medan, North Sumatra- The Limits of Ethno-Communal Cooperation 
District Background: 1998-2004 
The district of Medan in the province of North Sumatra is the fourth largest city in 
Indonesia. Initially settled as a colonial plantation town by the Dutch in the 1870s, 
Medan grew rapidly through the 1950s and 60s as a consequence of state-
supported transmigration (Agustono 2008: 3). At the time of the fall of the Suharto 
regime in 1998, Medan had grown to be a well-established urban agglomeration of 
1.9 million people (BPS 2004a). It has an ethnically and religiously diverse 
population. The largest group in the city are ethnic Bataks originating from the 
highlands of North Sumatra- though the 2000 census distinguishes between Batak 
sub-clans Tapanuli, Mandailing, Toba and Karo. Overall, the Javanese statistically 
constitute the largest ethnic group in Medan at 31.9 percent of the population. 
Ethnicity Population Percentage 
Javanese 607,771 31.9 
Batak, 
Tapanuli  280,785 14.7 
Chinese 213,987 11.2 
Mandailing 178,161 9.4 
Minangkabau 166,739 8.8 
Malay 125,094 6.6 
Batak, Toba 86,169 4.5 
Batak, Karo 78,744 4.1 
Acehnese 51,047 2.7 
Indian  14,682 0.8 
Other 101,094 5.3 
Total  1,904,273 100 
Figure 7 Ethnic Composition of Medan 2000. Source BPS 2004. 
Islam is a cross-cutting cleavage amongst the city’s numerous ethnic groups 
including the Javanese, Batak Tapanuli and Mandailing. The most recent census 
data suggest that Medan’s population is 68 percent Muslim, 21 percent Christian and 
10 percent Buddhist (BPS 2004a). 
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Religion Population Percentage 
Muslim 1,291,751 67.8 
Protestant 345,310 18.1 
Buddhist 197,986 10.4 
Catholic 55,002 2.9 
Hindu 12,888 0.7 
Other 1,336 0.1 
Total 1,904,273 100 
Figure 8 Religious Composition of Medan 2000. Source BPS 2004 
Medan is notable for the continued political dominance of New Order elites following 
the implementation of decentralisation in 2001. Rather than assuring resolution of 
local community concerns, Hadiz claims that decentralisation simply allowed 
Medan’s political parties and local assembly to become “vehicles for the distribution 
of the spoils of power among the wealthy” (Hadiz 2004: 628). The election of Mayor 
by the local district assembly (DPRD) in 2000, in which the ultimately successful 
candidate apparently bribed 16 PDI-P members of the local assembly to split with 
their nationally mandated nominee to support him, is one such instance of elite-level 
‘money politics’ (Hadiz 2004: 626).  
 
In contrast to the restricted campaigns for Medan mayor that characterised the 
earlier fiscal decentralisation period (2001-2004), the first direct local elections in 
2005 required candidates to mobilise voters rather than elites- with many candidates 
adopting complex strategies of cross-communal candidate pairing and campaigning 
(Hadiz 2010). It is against this backdrop of political candidates seeking support from 
the city’s diverse ethnic and religious communities that Medan’s 2010 pilkada is 
assessed. This highly competitive election, under the framework regulations of the 
2004 party and electoral regulations, had two rounds- the first with ten candidate-
pairs and the second with the two most successful candidate pairs. The reduction in 
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the number of candidate pairs between the first and second round transformed the 
nature of voter mobilisation- both in candidates mobilising strategies and the 
outcomes of the election. The two rounds of Medan’s 2010 election therefore 
demonstrate the variant effects of the intervening relational mechanism in 
determining strategies of mobilisation and community response.  
 
This chapter has three sections. The first part analyses the mobilisation strategies of 
deployed by candidates in the first round of election and their impact upon the voting 
behaviour of Medan’s ethnic and religious groups. The second part analyses these 
same processes in the subsequent run-off election. The third section assesses the 
implications of the findings for the strategic-relational theory, and the degree of 
reflexivity afforded amongst candidates, community leaders and voters.  
 
Medan: 2010 Election  
Candidate Pairing 
The continued political dominance of New Order business, ethnic and religious elites 
in Medan’s local politics was reflected in the candidates and candidate pairing 
strategies utilised in the 2010 pilkada. Almost all of the ten candidate pairs that 
nominated in the first round of election had strong links to Medan’s political networks 
of bureaucrats, business people and party operatives (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 
35). The pattern of pairing between candidates suggests that the electoral 
regulations mandating candidate pairing was used strategically to ensure broad voter 
appeal across the numerous ethnic, religious and associational networks in Medan. 
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Rahudman Harahap, the ultimately successful candidate, was the incumbent Mayor, 
a career bureaucrat and former District Secretary of the nearby South Tapanuli 
District. In controversial circumstances, Rahudman apparently cancelled an 
agreement to pair with ethnic Chinese candidate Sofyan Tan in the final days of 
nomination. Instead, he paired with Dzulmi Eldin, an ethnic Malay Muslim with a 
bureaucratic background (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Eldin had initially 
planned to run for Mayor himself with the backing of the largest party in the district 
assembly, Partai Demokrat. However, private polling found Rahudman was likely to 
win the mayoral election, leading Eldin just days prior to the close of nominations to 
arrange to pair as deputy to Rahudman (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). 
 
The runner-up in the mayoral election was Sofyan Tan. Raised in Medan’s ethnic 
Chinese Buddhist community, Tan grew up humbly in an area of the city “known for 
its graveyards and poverty” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Tan had become a 
successful businessman and had established an educational foundation aimed at 
building ‘mutual respect’ between Medan’s ethno-religious communities (Nagata 
2003: 375-376). Tan was also an advisor to Indonesian Chinese Clan Social 
Organisation (PSMTI), a prominent ethnic Chinese association. Evidently predicting 
that his non-Muslim (Buddhist) religious identity would become an issue of political 
contention in a Muslim majority city, Tan had initially sought to run only as deputy 
Mayor. He courted a number of other candidates and eventually reached an 
agreement with Rahudman to pair as his deputy (Interview with campaigner in 
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Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 37). However, in the final days before the close of 
nominations this agreement was abandoned when Rahudman paired with Eldin.  
Tan subsequently nominated as Mayoral candidate, pairing with a Malay Muslim 
woman, Nelly Armayanti. Armayanti was formerly the head of the Medan Electoral 
Commission and a lecturer in agriculture at North Sumatra Islamic University 
(Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Despite her strong networks in the Malay Muslim 
community, Tan claimed that gender equity was the primary motivation for his choice 
of Armayanti as it “was desirable in terms of gender equality and for the message it 
would send to women voters” (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Rather 
than Tan’s pairing strategy simply cultivating inter-ethnic partnership (Chinese-Malay) 
as predicted by classical centripetalist theory, other factors- for instance Armayanti’s 
connection to progressive networks of Muslim women and Medan’s NGOs sector- 
seemingly influenced Tan’s choice of pairing. 
 
Significantly, similar strategies of cross-ethnic pairing were adopted by other 
candidates too. Sigit Pramono Asri, a prominent member of the ethnic Javanese 
community and founding member of the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 
nominated with an ethnic Batak from the Karo sub-clan, Nurlisa Ginting- an engineer, 
university lecturer and government bureaucrat (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). 
Ajib Shah, an Afghan-Malay with a long history as a Golkar legislator in the provincial 
assembly and close links to North Sumatra’s preman organisations, nominated with 
local bureaucrat Binsar Situmorang- seemingly in an attempt to appeal to the 
Christian Batak community of which Binsar belonged. 
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Maulana Pohan, a Muslim Batak, chose to run with an ethnic Minang member of the 
Medan assembly with close links to the modernist Islamic organisations, 
Muhammadiyah and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 
39). Even those candidates who ran without a party endorsement such as leader of 
the ethnic Javanese group Pujakesuma, Joko Susilo, appealed across ethnic and 
religious constituencies by pairing with a Muslim Batak, Amir Hamzah, as his 
running-mate (Kompas 2010a). 
 
As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, the level of political competition 
between candidates of various ethnic descent, combined with electoral laws 
requiring paired candidacy, resulted in candidates selecting running-mates that 
would appeal to other ethnic constituencies. Candidates either reasoned or assumed 
that this was an electoral necessity. As a local party official commented prior to the 
poll, mixed-candidate pairs were vital to ensuring appeals to multiple constituencies: 
“if (the running mates) are both Mandailing, if they’re both Javanese, they aren’t 
going to win… homogenous pairs can lose. They [the candidates] don’t take that risk” 
(Interview in Aspinall 2011: 40). However, other dimensions of candidate identity, 
such as their ties to various ethnic-religious associations, were also considered when 
evaluating potential running-mates, to facilitate the mobilisation of multiple potential 
micro-constituencies on their behalf. The centripetal incentive for intra-ethnic 
competition and inter-ethnic cooperation in candidate pairing was therefore utilised 
by candidates to select partners with identities and social ties that would supplement 
their own deficiencies. There was evidently an assessment ofthe benefit that 
mobilisation of these micro-constituencies would provide them vis a vis other 
candidates. 
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Party Nomination/Involvement 
There is mixed evidence with regard to the influence and importance of parties in 
effecting the electoral strategies of candidates in the 2010 Medan election. Party 
nominations had a determinant influence on Sofyan Tan’s participation in the 
election. Tan’s personal background as well as his work in social activism and inter-
communal dialogue saw him successfully secure nomination from the secular-
nationalist party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuanga 
(PDI-P, Indonesia Democracy Party-Struggle) as well as the smaller Christian party, 
Partai Damai Sejahtera- despite his limited prior involvement with either of those 
parties (PDS- Prosperous Peace Party) (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36-37). 
These nominations were initially secured on the basis of Tan running as deputy to 
another candidate- though this strategy was foiled when Rahudman paired with Eldin 
in the final days of nominations (Interview with campaigner in Agustono 2009; 
Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38).  
 
Despite the failed Rahudman/Tan arrangement, it was concerns about the 
perception of the Medan ethnic Chinese community as a politically ‘serious’ 
constituency- particularly amongst the national leadership of the PDI-P including 
Megawati Sukarnoputri who had approved Tan’s nomination- which led Tan to 
participate in the election regardless. As one supporter stated, “[If we back down] we 
thought that the PDI-P and Megawati would view the Chinese community as not 
serious… We wanted to show we were not like that” (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman 
et al. 2011: 38). Demonstrating to PDI-P operatives and presumably local elites such 
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as Rahudman that the Chinese community was not ‘half-hearted’ about participating 
in politics was therefore the critical factor in Tan’s nominating in the 2010 election 
(Interview with campaigner in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 38). 
However, there was early recognition amongst Tan’s campaign team that his status 
as a non-Muslim would constrain their ability to broaden Tan’s appeal outside the 
Chinese community in Muslim-majority Medan (Interview with campaigner in Aspinall, 
Dettman et al. 2011: 38). Tan’s Buddhist religious affiliation resulted in him pairing 
with a prominent local Muslim, Nelly Armayanti, in order to give him strong 
connections and networks into Muslim communities.  
 
Islamic parties also endorsed a number of candidates, with Maulana receiving 
nomination and significant organisational assistance from the Islamic political branch 
(Partai Patriot) of Medan’s preman (gangster) network Permuda Pancasila. Pohan 
was also nominated by Islamist parties PAN and PPP as a result of the long 
association of his deputy, Arif with those organisations (Aspinall 2011: 39). Sigit Asri 
and Nurlisa Ginting secured the endorsement of the Islamist Partai Keadilan 
Sejahtera (PKS), one of the few major parties with a significant local party apparatus 
(Ufen 2011: 16). A number of candidates also ran independently of parties as was 
authorised by a 2009 ruling of Indonesia’s constitutional court (Buehler 2010). 
However, as will be discussed later these candidates had a relatively periphery role 
in the election process. 
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Golkar played a largely passive role in the Medan pilkada- nominating Rahudman 
after a poll conducted by a campaign consultancy reported that he was the favourite 
to win the election (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 36). Golkar party operatives were 
actively involved in Rahudman’s campaign, attending campaign meetings 
participating in the decisions of the larger ‘victory team’ (Pos 2010b). 
 
Parties therefore varied in their importance in the nomination process. Concerns 
about perceptions of the Chinese community within the nominating PDI-P proved 
pivotal in Tan’s decision to run for election- despite concerns about perceptions of 
the Buddhist religious identity. Ultimately, however, party nomination generally had 
little relation to the functional policy platforms or ideological approaches of 
candidates.  
Table 2 Medan 2010 Candidate Profiles 
Candidate Background Deputy Background 
Nominating 
Parties 
1. Sjahrial/Yahya N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2. Sigit/Nurlisa 
Muslim; 
Javanese; 
bureaucrat 
Nurlisa 
Ginting 
Muslim; Karo; 
lecturer; 
female PKS 
3. Indra/Del Yuzar N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4. Bahdin/Siyo 
Muslim; 
Javanese 
Kasim 
Cape N/A N/A 
5. Joko/Amir 
Muslim; 
Javanese 
leader 
Amir 
Hamzah Muslim; Batak None 
6. 
Rahudman/Dzulmi 
Muslim; 
Batak 
(Toba); 
Mayor  
Dzulmi 
Eldin 
Muslim, 
Malay, 
bureaucrat Golkar 
7. Arif/Supratikno Mandailing Supratikno 
Muslim; 
Javanese 
leader NA 
8. Pohan/Ahmad 
Muslim; 
Batak; fmr 
Dpt Mayor Ahmad Arif 
Muslim; 
Minangkabau; 
politician 
PAN, PPP; 
Partai 
Patriot 
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Pancasila 
9. Ajib/Binsar 
Muslim; 
Afghan-
Malay; 
politician 
(DPRD) 
Binsar 
Situmorang 
Christian; 
Batak; 
bureaucrat N/A 
10. 
Sofyan/Armayanti 
Buddhist; 
Chinese; 
NGO activist 
Nelly 
Armayanti 
Muslim, 
Malay; 
Lecturer; 
female PDI-P 
 
 
Round One: Campaign/Appeals (action and words) 
The mobilisation strategies of candidates during the first round of elections highlight 
the potential implicit in centripetalist frameworks not just for intra-ethnic and cross-
ethnic appeals to voters, but also utilisation of various personal identities and 
relational ties in candidate’s campaigns. 
 
Intra-Ethnic Appeals 
Candidate appeals to ethnic identity were commonplace during the first-round of the 
election. Various candidates sought support from their own ethnic or clan 
communities- especially after polling reported that Javanese and Batak voters were 
divided in their support for the pairings headed by the Asri, Rahudman and Maulana 
(Pos 2010c). Asri posted messages on his website, urging Javanese voters to be 
‘solid’ in their choice, vote as a ‘block’ and determine the outcome of the election in a 
single round- presumably for himself and his deputy (Pos 2010e). Posters of Asri’s 
partner Ginting dressed in traditional garb also appeared in Karo neighbourhoods 
throughout Medan (Fox 2011). Tan also established a sub-committee within his 
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campaign focused exclusively on mobilising voters in the ethnic Chinese community. 
Asri and Nurlisa’s campaign sought endorsements from a variety of Muslim youth 
organisations through their attendance at various local Islamic forums where both 
candidates promoted “courteous (santun) politics” and urged electors to vote 
“according to conscience”, ostensibly an appeal to their Muslim identity (Pos 2010a). 
Inter-Ethnic Appeals 
As forecast by classical centripetalist theory, the strong competition of the first round 
combined with Medan’s ethnically plural demography also prompted candidates to 
make extensive appeals across ethnic boundaries. Despite Tan’s prominence within 
the Chinese community, other candidates sought to mobilise Chinese voters on their 
behalf through posters proclaiming their support for Chinese community groups and 
attendance at various Chinese Organisation of Indonesia (INTI) public events (Pos 
2010e). Ajib Shah and his deputy candidate Binsar seemingly made the most explicit 
attempt to mobilise voters from the ethnic Chinese community, securing 
endorsements from a number of prominent Chinese leaders (Terrain 2010). During 
the last days of the election, they also worked with Chinese organisations to 
distribute free medicine and health-checks throughout the city as part of their 
campaign (MedanPunya 2010; Pos 2010b).  
Similarly, while Arif and Ginting’s campaign was largely Islamic, they sought to 
appeal for support amongst non-Muslim voters by visiting local Christian Batak 
churches (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 39). Rahudman’s own campaign promoted 
him as a civic nationalist who identified- or at least affiliated- with all ethnic and 
religious groups (Waspada 2010).  
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All candidates sought support in Medan’s largest ethnic group, the Javanese migrant 
community, through various ethnic associations and forums. At the request of 
candidates, various Javanese organisations hosted public events, rallies and 
meetings at which “Javanese leaders made statements about how this particular pair 
was the right choice for the Javanese” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 42).11 As 
expected by classical centripetalism, the strongly competitive nature of the first round 
of election therefore prompted candidates to mobilise voters from other ethnic 
groups by participating in a variety of cultural group events and rituals.  
 
Strategic Identity Activation 
In addition to mobilising voters from other ethnic groups numerous candidates also 
adopted profiles of ethnic and religious inclusion by accentuating particular aspects 
of their personal identity. Rahudman for instance, an ethnic Batak of the Toba sub-
clan, attended Karo Batak adat (customary) ceremonies- at which both he and his 
running-mate Eldin claimed Karo ancestry and danced for ‘almost an hour’ in full 
traditional Karo dress (Pos 2010d).  
 
Candidates who could claim Javanese or other ethnic connections did so- even 
when such identification had previously been peripheral to their public profile. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Whilst interviews with leaders of North Sumatra’s Javanese networks suggest they are 
somewhat sceptical of their ability to deliver voters for candidate- a fact supported in the 
electoral results- they continue to provide nominations from Javanese groups supporting 
competing candidates in the pilkada and provincial gubernatorial elections. See Aspinall, E. 
(2011). "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." Journal of East 
Asian Studies 11(2): 289-319. 
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Candidates discovered distant relatives of various ethnic descent. Candidate 
websites (Pos 2010d) and posters (Fox and Menchik 2011) promoted images of 
candidates dressed in “the traditional costume of any ethnic group but their own” 
(Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 43). In addition to both Rahudman and Eldin claiming 
Karo heritage, Maulana Pohan ‘added’ the Semibiring Batak clan to his family tree, 
and Sofyan Tan deployed his traditional Karo ‘Ginting’ name (Kompas 2010b). 
Cultural and identity-based appeals by candidates transcended the simple inter-
ethnic cooperation envisaged by classical centripetalism. Candidate-pairings 
strategically mobilised their diverse identity repertoires and ties to ethno-religious 
associations to mobilise voters on the basis not simply of co-existence but also 
shared group identity. 
 
In addition to activating multiple dimensions of their personal, public and group 
identity, all candidate pairs also publicised their various professional achievements. 
Despite being in office as Mayor less than ten months at the time of the election, 
Rahudman campaigned on his ‘can-do reputation’ of improving local infrastructure 
such as drains, traffic flows and formalisation of the city market (Aspinall, Dettman et 
al. 2011: 36). Such progress, he claimed, would be reversed if voters risked 
‘experimenting’ with ‘inexperienced’ candidates (Pos 2010b). Similarly, Tan 
underlined his role in the establishment of local organisations that “promoted inter-
communal harmony and addressed the needs of the poor” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 
2011: 44). All candidates emphasised programs to alleviate poverty, together with 
their links to various ethno-religious charity groups (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 
36).  
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The high level of competition in the first round of Medan’s 2010 election was a strong 
incentive for candidates to compete within their ethnic group- for instance by 
appealing to Batak sub-clans (Toba, Karo)- as well as appealing across ethnic 
constituencies. These campaigns operated at several layers of identity- ethnic, 
religious and personal- with candidates activating previously obscure dimensions of 
their personal identity to build relational ties of solidarity with voters.  
 
First Round Election Results 
As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, the high level of competition amongst 
candidates in the first round of election resulted in fragmentation of Medan’s Muslim 
vote between a number of candidates. The strategies developed by candidates to 
appeal across a variety of dimensions of identity seem to have had a significant 
influence on voting results in the first round.  
Religious Identities and Voting 
Given the large number of candidates participating in the first round and small 
number of non-Muslim candidates, assessing religious oriented voting in the first 
round is difficult. No clear relationship emerges from sub-district electoral data on 
whether Muslim majority-districts were significantly less likely to support non-Muslim 
candidates. Despite his Buddhist religious affiliation, Sofyan ranked first or second in 
the majority of Medan sub-districts, whilst the other candidate pairing containing a 
non-Muslim comprised of Ajib Shah and Christian Batak, Binsar Situmorang, ranked 
third or fourth.  
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According to sub-district census data from 2004, Medan contains only two non-
Muslim (Christian and Buddhist) majority sub-districts: Medan Tuntungan and Medan 
Baru. In both of these sub-districts the only pairing with a non-Muslim in a bupati 
position, Sofyan Tan, topped the poll receiving 22.8 percent and 27.5 percent of the 
vote. The second-ranking candidate pairs in these districts, however, contained 
Muslims in both bupati and deputy positions- suggesting that non-Muslim voters did 
not vote solely on the basis of religious identity of candidates. 
 
This inference is supported by the strong performance in these sub-districts by Shah 
and Binsar- who ranked third and fourth respectively, consistent with their district-
wide performance. Electoral returns from non-Muslim majority districts therefore 
suggest that while candidate pairings with non-Muslims performed slightly better in 
these districts than elsewhere in the city, the majority of voters in these sub-districts 
did not vote exclusively on the basis of the religious affiliation of the candidate pairs 
alone. 
 
Sofyan Tan did, however, perform very strongly in majority Muslim sub-districts 
containing more than 25 percent non-Muslims. In both of these districts Sofyan and 
his deputy- Nelly Armayanti- topped the poll, almost doubling the vote of the second 
placed candidate pairing- Rahudman and Dzulmi. Ajib and Binsar, the other pair 
containing a non-Muslim, ranked third in these districts. As will discussed further in 
analysis of ethnic voting, interpretation of these results as religiously based would be 
flawed, however, given the large proportion of ethnic Chinese voters in these sub-
districts.  
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Ethnic Identities and Voting 
Outcomes of voter mobilisation in the first round appear to have been strongly 
influenced by the diverse strategies of ethnic and cross-ethnic appeals evident in the 
pairing, nomination and campaign process.  
The largest ethnic group in Medan- Javanese migrants- split their vote between 
numerous candidates in spite of ethnic appeals by the former leader of the prominent 
Javanese organisation Pujakesuma, candidate Susilo, to ‘vote as a block’ (Pos 
2010e). Susilo and his deputy Amir only received 4.16 percent of total votes across 
Medan- ranking eighth of ten in most Javanese-majority sub-districts. There was a 
similar result for all Javanese candidates in the election. Indeed, in every sub-district 
with a Javanese majority population, a non-Javanese candidate-pairing 
(Rahudman/Dzulmi) won the largest proportion of the vote.  
 
Whilst Javanese voters do not seem to have followed ethnic cues in supporting 
candidates from their community, a clear ethnic pattern did emerge in the sub-district 
distribution of Tan’s support. In all sub-districts in which the Chinese population 
comprises one of the three largest groups- eight of twenty-one areas within the city- 
Tan topped the poll receiving more than 25 percent of the vote. In the two sub-
districts where ethnic Chinese constitute a plurality- Medan Kota and Medan 
Petisah- Tan recorded the highest results of any candidate in the first round, 
receiving 34.8 percent and 35.3 percent respectively. The incumbent pairing of 
Rahudman and Dzulmi also seem to have benefited from the bupati candidate’s 
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Batak Tapanuli ethnicity- ranking first or second in all but one district in which Batak 
Tapauli were the largest ethnic group.  
Despite Tan’s strong support within the Chinese community, Tan also performed 
consistently across all of Medan’s sub-districts with his worst ranking occurring (5th) 
in Medan Ambias- where ethnic Chinese make up only 4 percent of the population 
(BPS 2004a). The Malay ethnicity of his running-mate- Nelly Armayanti- may have 
influenced Tan’s strong support across the city. In sub-districts where Malay’s 
comprised one of the largest three groups in the area, Tan on average ranked third 
of the ten candidates. As predicted by classical centripetalist theory, Tan’s pairing 
strategy and broader campaign emphasising his status as a “symbol of democratic 
and social reform” therefore proved effective in mobilising voters of various ethnic 
and religious groups in the first round (Agustono 2009; Pos 2010f). 
 
Party Nominations and Voting 
Despite the explicitly Islamic platform of the PKS, the party’s strong organisational 
apparatus in Medan may have influenced voting results for Sigit and Nurlisa, who 
performed consistently well across all of Medan’s sub-districts. Ranking third overall, 
the PKS nominated ticket even performed strongly in non-Muslim majority sub-
districts- placing second in Medan Tuntungan and third in Medan Baru, well ahead of 
the overall winner of the poll Rahudman who polled fifth in these sub-districts. Whilst 
the ethnic Karo composition of these sub-districts may also have been important in 
influencing the voting outcomes, the consistent support for the PKS tickets across 
Medan suggests that the strong local organisational apparatus of the PKS (Ufen 
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2011) may have played an important role in mobilising voters across ethnic 
constituencies. 
The support of the Golkar Party and it’s local apparatus of campaigners may have 
assisted in the mobilisation of voters for the incumbent Rahudman and his running-
mate. Though evidence is limited of substantive Golkar campaigning is limited, 
Rahudman polled first or second in every sub-district where Javanese Muslims are 
the largest ethnic group. 
 
Candidates who participated in the election without the support of parties performed 
poorly. Joko Susilo, for instance, instead sought to rely on support from the 
Javanese ethnic association, Pujakesuma. This variable may explain why Joko and 
Amir polled so poorly across all Medan sub-districts. 
 
Second Round Campaign (words and actions) 
With the retirement from the election of the other eight candidate pairs, the contest 
between Rahudman and Tan required both campaigns to implement a strategy that 
would at least double their respective returns from the first round. The classical 
centripetalist expectation that inter-ethnic cooperation was contingent upon the 
number of candidates competing was fulfilled in this second round. However, as the 
strategic imperative for inter-ethnic cooperation diminished, candidates also re-
weighed the personal and group identities and networks that would now be the focus 
for mobilisation. For Rahudman and his supporters, the second round of voting came 
to be framed as a contest between a Muslim from the established political elite, and 
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a non-Muslim political outsider from the ethnic Chinese community. Religious 
affiliation, rather than ethnic identity, subsequently became the targeted cleavage 
during the second round.  
 
Religious Appeals 
Tan’s strong showing in the first round was interpreted by Rahudman as a 
consequence of the large number of candidates splitting Medan’s Muslim vote- an 
outcome that was apparently foreseen by Tan’s campaign team (Interview in Aspinall, 
Dettman et al. 2011: 46). The key to the second round was therefore Muslim 
mobilisation in a Muslim-majority city on the basis of Tan’s Buddhist religious 
identity- despite his pairing with prominent Malay Muslim, Nelly Armayanti.  
 
Neither Rahudman nor Eldin were especially prominent in Medan’s Muslim 
community prior to the 2010 election. In the second round, however, they utilised a 
strategy to “paint themselves in more Islamic colours” and mobilise networks linked 
to local government and the Golkar Party to urge Medan’s electors to vote according 
to religious affiliation and identity (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 48). Central to 
Rahudman’s exclusivist religious affiliation campaign was mobilisation of Muslim 
organisational networks and ties to disseminate anti-Tan materials and mobilise 
Muslim voters against him. A meeting was called by local Muslim leaders including 
representatives from Rahudman’s nominating party Golkar and bureaucrats from the 
Medan Department of Religion, at which it was warned that Medan’s Muslims were 
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at the “precipice of a pit” with the possibility of a non-Muslim Mayor (Aspinall, 
Dettman et al. 2011: 47).  
 
Also present as this meeting were local operatives of the Council of Indonesian 
Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia-MUI), a conservative, anti-pluralist Islamic 
organisation with close ties to local and national government officials (Gillespie 2007; 
Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 47). With the support of MUI, Rahudman and Eldin 
secured endorsement from Medan’s Communication Forum of Preachers who 
directed local clerics to infuse daily Islamic prayers with proclamation of religious 
duty to support “a leader of the same faith” (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 48). 
Brochures, bulletins and writings were also posted on websites of local clerics citing 
Quranic verses that “forbid the Islamic ummat [community] to elect/appoint elders 
from among the non-Muslim kafir” (JabalNoor 2010). As the head of MUI in Medan, 
Mohammad Hatta stated, “we directed them and they were the ones who then went 
out to the mosques and the sub-district [to campaign]” (Interview with Hatta in 
Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 47).  
 
In the second round campaign, Rahudman and Eldin therefore both sought to 
accentuate particular aspects of their personal, public and group identities, using 
connections in the local bureaucratic and Golkar party mobilise Medan’s various  
religious associations and networks on the basis of Tan’s identity as a non-Muslim. 
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Tan attempted to counter Rahudman’s campaign by appealing to voters on the basis 
of his character as a ‘tokoh yang pluralis’ (pluralist figure)- emphasising especially 
his background in inter-religious dialogue (Agustono 2009). However, Tan also 
enlisted the support of candidates from the first round such as Maulana Pohan, 
whose clerical supporters from Islamic parties PAN and PPP posed for photographs 
with Tan (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 49). Tan’s campaign in the second round 
mobilised the networks of his deputy candidate within the Muslim community to 
counter the exclusivist propaganda disseminated by Rahudman’s allies in the MUI. 
Leaflets supporting Tan and Armayanti were also distributed by students involved in 
modernist Islamic organisations of Medan. Citing medieval Islamic jurist, Ibn 
Tammiyah, these leaflets included the quotation: “an Islamic state run by Muslims 
who are tyrannical, corrupt and liars, that state will be destroyed” (Waspada 2010). 
 
Ethnic Appeals 
With the mobilisation of religious (Muslim) networks in the second round, there also 
emerged issues of ethnic discrimination and prejudice. A number of Muslim leaders 
supporting Rahudman rationalised the campaign against Tan as a consequence of 
the Chinese community’s propensity to ‘discriminate’ in favour of their co-ethnics in 
business. As one Rahudman campaigner stated, ethnic Chinese are ‘outsiders’ who 
have the “mentality of boarders” and do not meaningful integrate into the Indonesian 
nation (Interview in Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 50). Anti-Chinese leaflets with this 
propaganda message were circulated amongst the same networks of local Muslims 
utilised for religious based mobilisation. The Islamic website Majlis Ta’lim Jabal Noor 
claimed Tan aimed to turn Medan into a “Chinatown”, and cited high-profile 
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corruption cases involving Chinese businessmen to conclude that kafir (non-Muslims) 
would “betray the Indonesian nation” (JabalNoor 2010).  
 
Strategic Identity Mobilisation 
In addition to mobilising his ethnic Batak tribe and Muslim religious affiliation as 
expected by classical centripetalist theory, Rahudman’s religious and ethnic 
mobilisation strategy in the second round also leveraged networks of middle-class 
Muslim bureaucrats through his incumbency as Mayor and the local relational ties of 
his nominating party, Golkar.  
 
As a consequence of this campaign, Tan filed a case in the Constitutional Court 
alleging that Rahudman had directed the government bureaucracy against his 
candidacy- citing particularly irregularities in voter turn-out in the second round (Pos 
2010d; Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 51). As the case is still pending, there is 
currently insufficient evidence to confirm Tan’s claim of a bureaucratic campaign 
against him- rather than the mobilisation of various ethnic and religious networks 
with strong connections to the district government. However, it is evident that clear 
strategic calculations were made about Muslim mobilisation based upon Tan’s 
identity as a non-Muslim. In order to assess the efficacy of these ethnic, religious 
and party-based mobilisation strategies in influencing voter choice, we now turn to 
the election results for the second round.  
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Second Round Results 
The second round of Medan’s 2010 election saw Rahudman receive the vast 
majority of votes- recording an average of 65.9 percent across all sub-districts within 
the city. Inversely, Tan received 34.1 percent of the vote. These broad results mask 
more complex ethno-religious dynamics with close links to party nominations and the 
various identities and networks of candidate pairs. 
 
Voter turn-out across all sub-districts increased substantially from the first round 
(678,804) to the second round (736,872). Similar trends of increased turn-out 
occurred across all sub-districts with the exception of one- Medan Area, which is an 
area with a sizable number of Chinese voters. In contrast to the district-wide 
increase in voter turnout, Medan Area experienced lower turnout of 9 percent. Whilst 
results of this single sub-district would not have altered the overall election outcome, 
results from Medan Area will be treated separately from the broader analysis of the 
role of identity in assessing outcomes of voter mobilisation. 
 
Religious Identities and Voting 
The successful framing of the second round of Medan’s 2010 campaign on religion 
was seen by most observers as critical for Rahudman’s land-slide victory. One local 
news blog quoted a community leader as saying “if Rahudman’s opponent had not 
been a non-Muslim, I guarantee it is not certain that Rahudman would have been 
elected by the people” (Waspada 2010). The mobilisation of religious identity was at 
least partly reflected in sub-district voting results.  
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Rahudman received a strong result of 68 percent in all Muslim majority sub-districts, 
with significantly fewer votes in non-Muslim majority sub-districts (41.9 percent). In 
contrast, Tan received the bulk of his votes from non-Muslim majority sub-districts- 
winning 58 percent of voters in these areas, compared with a result of 34.12 percent 
district-wide. All Muslim majority sub-districts were strongly positively correlated with 
majority vote for Rahudman (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 52). Underpinning these 
religious voting patterns, however, was a more complex pattern of voting based on a 
variety of ethnic and social ties linking candidates with voters. 
 
Ethnic Identities, Party Nominations and Voting 
The mobilisation by Rahudman’s campaign of various networks of middle-class 
Muslims harvested an extremely strong result for this pair in all sub-districts in which 
ethnic Javanese comprise the largest group. Rahudman’s religious campaign using 
the organisational apparatus of Golkar as well as networks largely dominated by 
Javanese Muslims such as MUI (Agustono 2008) ensured an ethnic as well as 
religious aspect to voting patterns. Rahudman and his deputy Dzulmi also found 
strong support from their respective Batak Toba and Malay ethnic groups, receiving 
the vast majority (65 percent or more) of votes in all sub-districts in which Batak 
Toba or Malay were the largest three groups. 
 
In contrast to the first round, less definitive trends of ethnic Chinese voting emerged 
in the second round for Sofyan Tan and deputy Nelly Armayanti. While in the 
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previous round sub-districts with a large (10 percent or more) Chinese population 
were highly likely to support Tan and Armayanti, in the second round this pairing 
placed second behind Rahudman in all but one of these sub-districts (excluding 
Medan Area- where Tan also ranked second).  The sizable proportion of Javanese in 
these sub-districts cannot alone explain why Tan suffered a loss of 6 percent in 
Medan Kota- a sub-district with a large plurality of Batak Christians and Chinese 
Buddhists. Indeed, a clear decline in the ethnic Chinese vote for Tan is detectable in 
numerous sub-districts with a large proportion of Chinese voters- Medan Timur, 
Medan Barat and Medan Maimun- between the first and second round. 
 
Some observers attributed the decline in Tan’s vote from the first round in Chinese 
areas to fear of repeats of the anti-Chinese violence that occurred in Medan and 
throughout Indonesia in 1998 (Aspinall, Dettman et al. 2011: 52). However, as Fox 
observes, it’s also possible that the Chinese community leaders supporting Ajib 
Shah and Binsar Situmorang in the first round made a pragmatic choice to mobilise 
in support of Rahudman out of concern regarding exclusion from district government 
if they supported their co-ethnic, Sofyan Tan, who was likely to lose (Fox 2011). 
Evidence for this pattern of community leader and voter reflexivity is limited. 
However, it is evident that broader strategic calculations were made about the 
viability of Tan as a candidate in light of his comparatively weak networks and 
associational ties in Medan’s Muslim community.  
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Analysis and Conclusion 
The two rounds of Medan’s 2010 election highlight the impact of the intervening 
variable of competition in influencing strategies of identity-based voter mobilisation. 
As the number of candidate pairs reduced from ten in the first round to two in the 
second, the nature and tone of candidates’ appeals to ethno-communal identity 
altered significantly, strongly influencing the outcome of identity-based voting.  
However, as emphasised by the strategic-relational theory, the level of competition 
alone is inadequate to explain outcomes of identity-based mobilisation. Rather, in 
each round, candidate pairs participated in critical reflection of their identity and 
capabilities and the variant advantages these might provide for voter mobilisation. In 
the first round, for instance, candidate pairs mobilised voters not simply across or 
within ethnic groups (classical centripetalism). Rather candidate pairs accentuated 
those aspects of their various ethnic, group and associational ties which they thought 
would be useful in building a rapport with voters- even when these were previously 
peripheral to their public profile.  
 
In the second round, Rahudman’s strategic exploitation of Tan’s non-Muslim identity 
enabled the construction of a threat to the majority religious identity group. Coupled 
with a campaign of mobilisation in which Rahudman leaveraged ties to Medan’s 
Muslim middle-class, the outcome of this perceived threat was a significantly higher 
voter turnout and clear patterns of Javanese sub-districts consistently supporting 
Rahudman and his deputy.  
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Interestingly, the efficacy of Rahudman’s campaign in mobilising Medan’s Muslims 
on the basis of a threat to their religious majority community seems also to have 
resulted in some ethnic Chinese voters abandoning Tan in the second round- 
possibly on the basis of maintaining links to the Muslim dominated district 
government in Medan. Such a result can only be explained by accepting that political 
participants- candidates, community leaders and voters themselves- are at least 
partly reflexive about the identities they mobilise or respond to as politically salient, a 
perspective which is absent in classical centripetal theory.  
 
 
 
‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
91	  of	  102	  
 
Ch 7 Conclusion  
This study examined the proposition that institutional incentives created by 
decentralisation are open to re-interpretation by political actors in light of their 
various identities, social ties and capabilities (Jessop 2001). In seeking to probe this 
research issue through two case-studies of district election processes in Indonesia, 
two hypotheses formed the basis for examination.    
 
The first hypothesis was the classical centripetalist expectation, derived from the 
research of Donald Horowitz (1985, 2007, 2008): 
(H1) decentralisation increases political competition, leading candidates to 
mobilise ethnic and sub-ethnic identities and/or cooperate with candidates 
from other ethnic groups 
 
The second hypothesis was the strategic-relational expectation, of which this study 
was a plausibility-probe:  
H2) strategic incentives of political competition associated with 
decentralisation interact with the identities, social networks and capabilities of 
candidates in determining the mobilisation strategies adopted not only by 
them but also relevant community leaders.  
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The findings from the case-studies of Poso and Medan provide cogent evidence that 
H1 is insufficient in explaining the diverse identities and networks through which 
voters are mobilised in the context of decentralisation. H2 is found to provide a fuller 
analytical understanding of the origins and processes associated with ethno-
communal mobilisation, though some limitations and revision of the theory is 
required. 
 
Findings 
The strategies of ethno-communal mobilisation employed in Poso’s 2005 election 
and Medan’s 2010 election demonstrate that whilst nominally important in enabling 
cross-ethnic pairing, the incentives provided by centripetalist electoral and party 
regulations are at best a partial explanation of voter mobilisation outcomes in the 
context of decentralisation.  
 
In Poso four key points emerge. 
- In addition to cross-communal cooperation, candidates paired and mobilised 
on the basis of their professional and personal backgrounds. 
- Party organisational apparatus- or lack thereof- was an important determinant 
of support for candidates. 
- Muslim voters were more willing to support Christian candidates in the top 
bupati position than Christian voters- possible related to particular party 
(Golkar). 
- Pamona chiefs/youth activists ignored distinctions between the ‘indigeneity’ of 
candidates, instead mobilising support for the candidate (Ingiriwang) with the 
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strongest networks and organisational capacity in Poso’s religious, ethnic and 
political communities.  
 
In Medan, four points are also pertinent. 
- Strong competition in the first round led candidates to promote ethnic and 
religious inclusivity and also ‘discover’ and mobilise new dimensions of their 
ethnic and personal identity. 
- A proportion of Chinese community leaders and voters seemingly voted for 
Rahudman in the second round, in spite of the anti-Tan campaign.  
- In mobilising Medan’s Muslims on the basis of a threat to the religious 
dominance of their community, Rahudman relied heavily on ties to Medan’s 
Muslim middle-class through links to various Islamic associations and 
networks. 
- Tan’s decision to participate in the poll despite his non-Muslim identity was 
strongly influenced by Chinese community leaders concerns about the 
potential political damage of Tan’s withdrawal from the election. A broader 
notion of strategic incentives therefore needs to be understood about how 
decentralisation provides minorities with avenues for political participation.  
 
In relation to H1, these findings suggest that when provided with an institutional 
opportunity such as candidate pairing to appeal across ethnic groups, candidates will 
seek to mobilise voters across the boundaries of ethnic identity. 
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In explaining the formation of mobilisation strategies, the strategic-relational theory 
(H2) provides a more complete account of the various personal, group identities and 
social ties through which voter support may be mobilised by candidates. In both the 
Poso and Medan cases the utility of this theory is demonstrated as institutional 
incentives such as candidate pairing and decentralisation were transmitted into voter 
mobilisation outcomes through a causal process involving recurrent reflection upon 
the various identities, networks and organisational ties of the candidate pair.  
 
However, it was not only  candidates who engaged in reflexivity when determining 
the identities associated with mobilisation. Examples from both Poso and Medan 
demonstrate that community leaders may play an important ‘gatekeeper’ role in 
determining the outcome of voter mobilisation. In both cases, community leaders and 
voters made reflexive decisions about communal mobilisation: the Pamona 
chiefs/youth activists in Poso supporting Ingkiriwang; and Chinese voters in the 
second round of Medan’s election seemingly supporting Rahudman. 
 
In neither of these examples did all voters follow the same pattern. The Pamona vote 
recorded by Sowolino (the ‘full Pamona’) was in the range of 20 percent across all 
Pamona-majority sub-districts. Meanwhile, the precise extent of the Chinese vote 
that shifted to support Rahudman in the second round is difficult assess. However, in 
both cases the proportion of voters who seemingly engaged in reflexive analysis of 
candidates based on their broader appeal and likelihood of electoral success is 
sufficient to form an additional link in the causal process explaining outcomes of 
identity-based voter mobilisation: that of community leaders.  
Ties	  &	  Tiers:	  Decentralisation	  and	  Ethno-­‐Communal	  Mobilisation	   Gerard	  McCarthy	  
95	  of	  102	  
 
Theory Revision 
The concerns of some community leaders- in both cases seemingly linked to the low 
probability of their co-ethnic candidate obtaining sufficient support to win the poll in 
the presence of more competitive candidates- was determinitive in the outcome of 
large-scale mobilisation in their respective communities. This additional link 
(community leaders) is factored into the revised strategic relational theory below as a 
mechanism causally related to the ultimate outcome of voter mobilisation in the 
context of decentralisation. The possibility of macro-framework (party and electoral 
regulations) amendment also emerges from the outcome of voter mobilisation.  
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Figure 9 Classical Centripetal & Revised Strategic-Relational Theory 
 
 Implications and Avenues for Further Research 
The demonstrated limitations of the classical centripetalist theory, and the utility of 
the newly revised strategic-relational theory of identity-based voter mobilisation, 
have important implications for theories and approaches to political engineering.  
 
Rather than viewing macro-frameworks and the incentives they create as 
determinant of individual action, the constructivist conceptualisation of identity 
adopted in this study enables a reconceptualisation of the relationship between 
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structure and agency in which “institutions constrain and refract politics but are never 
the sole cause of outcomes” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 4). By embracing “the 
possibility of reflection on the part of the individual and collective actors about the 
strategic selectivities inscribed within structures” (2001: 1224- emphasis added), the 
strategic-relational theory tested in these case-studies has important implications for 
theories of institutional design. Largely grounded in rational choice theories of 
institutionalism, these approaches generally do not account for the multi-
dimensionality of individual and group identity.  
 
Adopting such an approach to the incentives created by institutional frameworks 
such as decentralisation opens up further avenues for research eg. how 
decentralisation impacts the development of party systems and ethno-communal 
relations in emerging, ethnically diverse democracies. In addition to the experience 
of Indonesia, other research suggests that national parties find it difficult to form 
substantive coalitions with regional parties as decentralisation minimises their levers 
of influence over sub-national elites (Sabatini 2003). Whilst Indonesia’s party 
regulations outlaw regional parties, the processes revealed in this study also may be 
salient to any understanding of how decentralisation impacts the politicisation of 
ethnicity and group identity in these national contexts.  
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